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Abstract
The decision to buy a fare that is higher than the desired fare, under the situation
when the desired fare is not available, is known as sell-up. Passengers' willingness to sell-
up can have considerable impact on airline revenues. The extent of this impact is
dependent upon the method used to control booking limits and other parameters
associated with passenger demand and fare structure.
In this thesis we demonstrate the importance of incorporating sell-up in airline
revenue management. The improvement in revenue, under various scenarios, and under
various seat inventory control algorithms, is discussed. We also analyze the influence of
demand factor, spill, sell-up rate and fare ratio on these improvements.
A modification of the EMSRb heuristic is proposed to capture the revenue
potential associated with passenger sell-up. The proposed rule increases the protection
levels, obtained from the EMSRb algorithm, as long as the expected gain, from every
additional seat protected, is greater than the expected loss. Unlike the existing models, the
proposed rule uses expected spill to determine the expected number of passengers that
would sell-up at a given demand level and sell-up rate, and then adjusts the protection
levels accordingly. This makes it robust to variations in demand levels.
We have also developed a simulation to compare the performance of the existing
rules with that of the proposed heuristic. The simulation has the ability to account for
errors in sell-up estimation and variability in demands. It is shown that the revenue gains
under the proposed rule may not exist under all situations. In the tests performed in this
thesis, the improvements over the original EMSRb algorithm vary from 0% to over 2.5%.
Although the gains are not consistent, the proposed rule does not cause any negative
impact on overall revenues and hence is unlikely to pose any risk when implemented over
the original EMSRb algorithm.
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Peter P. Belobaba
Title: Associate Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter gives a brief overview of the field of Revenue Management. The
two most important components, Differential Pricing and Seat Inventory Control, are
discussed. We then introduce the concept of sell-up in Airline Revenue Management.
Finally, the goal and structure of this thesis is presented.
1.1 Revenue Management
Revenue Management, Yield Management or Perishable Asset Revenue
Management is a set of techniques used by airlines to maximize revenues through
differential pricing and seat inventory control. Differential Pricing is the practice of
offering a variety of fare products differentiated in terms of service amenities and/or
travel restrictions, at a variety of price levels. Seat inventory control is the practice of
determining the number of seats on a flight to be made available for sale to a particular
fare product'.
P.P. Belobaba. "Airline O-D Seat Inventory Control without Network Optimization ", June 1995.
1.1.1 Differential Pricing
During the period of U.S. airline regulation, the fare structure of airlines was
relatively simple and static. Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) controlled all fares. The fare
for each market was established on the basis of average industry cost and distance. All
airlines offered similar fare structure and thus there was no competition on the basis of
price. Moreover, the CAB fare formula guaranteed a reasonable return on investment for
all carriers. Since the airlines could not compete on fares, improving service was the only
available option. In an attempt to increase market share, the airlines provided high quality
in-flight service and increased their frequency. The increased frequency resulted in lower
load factors and a significant number of surplus seats. The airlines then faced the problem
of utilizing the available capacity, which was possible by stimulating demand through
lower fares. Although the regulations did not allow much flexibility in fares, nevertheless,
a few attempts were made to generate new passengers through discount pricing schemes.
Among them the most popular ones were student fares, night coach fares and "supersaver"
fares introduced by American Airlines. Thus, the use differential pricing, though
extremely limited, started even prior to deregulation in the U.S. airline industry.
After deregulation, airlines were free to come up with their own fare structure and
change their fares as often as they desired. The most common approach was to
differentiate the market into segments based upon consumer behavior and charge each
segment according to its willingness to pay. This led to a very dynamic and complex fare
structure. Airlines came up with a number of fares in each origin destination (OD) market.
Successful differential pricing requires effective market segmentation. For this
purpose, airlines used "fences", which took the form of various restrictions associated with
each "fare product". In airline terminology, the term fare product, refers to the fare and
the restrictions associated with it. Some common restrictions used by the airlines are
e Saturday night stay
e Advance purchase requirements
e Round trip
e Non-refundability or partial refundability
e Flight validity (only for special holiday seasons, off-peak periods etc.)
Each of the above restriction is designed according to certain characteristics of
passenger behavior and usually has different impact on different types of passengers. For
example, the Saturday night stay is considered to be the most powerful restriction to
restrict business passengers from buying a fare associated with it. This same restriction,
however, has negligible impact on leisure passengers. In airline terminology, a business
passenger is the one who is traveling to fulfill his business obligations and whose traveling
expense is borne by the business. He has a tight schedule and is usually unable to
purchase the ticket well in advance. Leisure traveler, on the other hand, is the one who is
travelling for the purpose of pleasure and is usually paying from his own pocket. He is
comparatively much flexible in his travel plans and can purchase tickets well in advance.
Note that there might also be people who would have partial characteristics of both these
categories. In his Ph. D. thesis, Belobaba has developed a well structured definition of
various types of passengers.
The fare structures essentially depend upon market conditions, passenger types and
above all, the competition. Airlines serving in the same market usually offer similar fare
products. However, the number of seats made available for each of the fare products may
vary dramatically.
1.1.2 Seat Inventory Control
In today's competition, the decisions regarding the fare structure of an airline are
very much dependent on its competitors. Most airlines match the fares offered by other
airlines. However, the actual number of seats offered in each fare class is comparatively
independent. This makes leaves Seat Inventory Control a very important component of
Airline Revenue Management that can influence the revenue earning capability of an
airline in a competitive environment. However controlling as airlines' inventory is much
complex than that for other industries.
Consider the example of the music industry. It does not offer discounts on a newly
released album that is initially bought by the real big fans or consumers willing to pay the
high price. As time passes, most of the big fans have bought the album. At this time the
industry starts giving various discount or incentives on the album. The purpose is to
capture the consumers who instead of paying the full price, would rather borrow it form a
friend or not listen to it at all. Note that the whole process is quite straightforward
because of the fact that the customer with the highest willingness to pay comes first.
Airlines do not enjoy this luxury. The passengers willing to pay the full or higher fares are
essentially the business people who request seats close to the departure date. On the other
hand the low fare consumers are the leisure passengers who is ready to book his seat well
in advance. This requires airlines to first forecast the number of high fare passengers and
protect seats for them. The nun ber of seats protected should be such that only the seats
that are not likely to be sold to higher fare passengers are made available to the lower fare
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1.1: Booking pattern, Business versus Leisure passengers
Due to the stochastic nature of demand, the problem of determining the optimal
protection level is a complex one. Many attempts have been made to solve the problem.
1 Based upon experimental scenarios used in PODS, Passenger Origin Destination Simulator, a joint
project of MIT Flight Transportation Laboratory and the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group.
Among them, the method of Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR)2 and its
modifications have been widely adopted by the industry. The method is further discussed
in chapter 2.
1.2 Sell-up
Consider the example of a passenger who wishes to travel in a particular OD
market. He prefers to buy a cheap fare and requests a particular discounted fare. There
are no seats available in his desired fare class and his request is thus refused. At this point
the passengers could do one of the following:
" Try another flight for the same OD market, in his desired fare class, with the same
airline.
* Try another flight for the same OD market, in his desired fare class, with a different
airline.
* Try another flight for a different OD market, with the same or different airline (rare
case; only true for some leisure passengers)
* Not travel at all
* Try the next higher fare class on the flight he initially requested.
2 P. P. Belobaba, "Air Travel Demand andAirline Seat Inventory Management", Ph.D. thesis, MIT, May
1987.
The last phenomenon is known as passenger sell-up. Note that all the above
options, except for the one when the passenger cancels his travel plans, come under the
category of passenger diversion. Sell-up is a special type of diversion in which the
passenger accepts a higher fare without changing the flight. It is also known as vertical
shift or trade-up3 .
1.3 Goal of Thesis
According to Robert Crandall, Chairman and CEO of AMR and American
Airlines, yield management is "the single most important technical development in
transportation management since we entered the era of deregulation in 1979" . The
reason is the enormous gains in revenue without any significant costs. Since the
development of the Belobaba's EMSR algorithm in 1987, various modifications have been
made. The success of each modification is measured by its capability to improve the
revenue gains as against the costs or risks associated with it. The purpose of this thesis is
to evaluate yet another modification of the EMSR algorithm; the incorporation of
passenger sell-up.
The thesis proposes a new approach to incorporate passenger sell-up in the EMSR
algorithm. The method considers the expected spill at any demand and uses this value
3 Bohutinsky, C.H., "The Sell-Up Potential ofAirline Demand", MS thesis, MIT Flight Transportation
Laboratory, June 1990.
4 Darrow, Leinkuhler and B. Smith. "Yield Management atAmerican Airlines". Interfaces January-
February 1992, p.3 1.
(along with the expected sell-up rate), to compute the expected number of passengers that
would sell-up at any protection level. The protection levels are then readjusted to
accommodate passenger sell-up. A new simulation is developed to evaluate the
performance of this technique. The simulation has the provision of defining different sell-
up rates for the EMSR algorithm and the passenger choice. The former can be considered
as the sell-up rate assumed by an airline and the later can be considered as the true sell-up
rate. By changing he values for the two sell-up rates, under various scenarios, the risk
involved in incorporating sell-up is also evaluated.
1.4 Structure of Thesis
The remaining part of this thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 gives an
overview of previous studies done in the area of passenger sell-up. The original EMSRb
algorithm and its modifications are briefly described. The study performed by
Bohuntinsky is also discussed.
In Chapter 3, we discuss the influence of sell-up on optimal protection levels. We
start with a simple deterministic example to show the change in overall revenues by
considering passenger sell-up. Then we derive the expressions for optimal protection level
under passenger sell-up for simple cases involving two fare classes. By the end of this
chapter, we develop our proposed heuristic to incorporate passenger sell-up in the
EMSRb algorithm.
In Chapter 4, we present a simulation to analyze the performance of the proposed
heuristic. The initial part of the chapter describes the structure and environment of the
simulation. In the later part, we simulate two scenarios. The performance of the original
EMSRb heuristic and proposed rule is discussed. We primarily focus on the ability of the
heuristics to capture the revenue associated with passenger sell-up. The parameters that
influence the relative performance of the original and the modified rules are also discussed.
In Chapter 5, we perform sensitivity analysis. We analyze the performance of the
modified rules under situations when we do not have perfect knowledge of sell-up rates
existing among passengers. We also test situations when there is high variability in
demand. The focus is on the changes in relative performance of the modified rules and
their robustness to errors on sell-up rate and variability in demand.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we present an evaluation of the proposed rule, summarize
our findings and propose future research directions.
Chapter 2
Previous Studies
This chapter gives an overview of the previous work done in the area of passenger
sell-up and then explains the difference between the proposed approach and the previous
models. It starts with a brief overview of the EMSR algorithm and then goes to the sell-
up models and studies done in the past.
2.1 Belobaba's EMSR algorithm
In his doctoral dissertation', Belobaba developed a powerful heuristic, which he
named as the EMSR heuristic. The heuristic, either in its true form or as a modified
version, is being used by a number of airlines to practice Seat Inventory Control. The
algorithm considers expected revenues from the stochastic demand for each fare class and
determines the protection levels that would maximize the total expected revenue.
The expected number of bookings in any class i, given a seat allocation of Si, can
be defined in the form of the following integral:
1 Peter. P. Belobaba, "A ir Travel Demand and A irline Seat Inventory Management", Ph.D. thesis,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 1987.
S ao
b2(S) = fr, * p,(r,)dr, + f p(r)dr, * S,
0 S,
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b, is the expected number of bookings in class i, at a seat allocation of S,.
r, is the random variable for demand in class i
p,(r) is the probability distribution function for the demand in class i
P,(r, -S) is the probability that the demand for class i would be greater than Si
Note that the first term in the above equation (integral from 0 to Si) represents the
expected bookings when demand is less then seat allocation and the second term
represents the expected bookings when the demand is more than the seat allocation. The
expected revenue from class i, can thus be defined as
Ri(S;) = f;* b;(S;)
Here f; is the average fare from class i. The total expected revenue would be the sum of
expected revenue from all classes.
Under distinct fare class inventories, a seat can only be sold to a class for which it
was initially allocated. Belobaba argued that for distinct fare class inventories, the total




ij are any two fare classes
ni is the optimal number of seats allocated for class i
EMSRi(7ci) is the expected marginal seat revenue from the it seat in class i.
EMSRi(7ci) = fi* P(ni)
Unlike distinct fare class inventories, under nested fare classes, a seat protected for
any class can be sold to that class or any higher valued class. For the two-class nested




Where class i is the higher class. In other words, the revenue would be maximized if we
protect seats for the higher class till the expected revenue from protecting that seat is
more than the next lower fare.
The same concept was used for more than two classes. The total protection level
for the higher class is then the sum of the protections against each of the lower classes. In
order to reduce computational effort, this approach was later modified. Aggregate values
were used to represent combined fare and demand density for all higher classes. The
algorithm is known as EMSRb. According to the EMSRb algorithm, for any class i, we
keep on protecting seats (for class i and higher), till the following condition holds true:
[2.3]
Here
EMSRi(7ir) = expected marginal seat revenue from class i and higher
= fii*P(riji>S)
f1i. represents the aggregated fare of class i and higher. It is actually a weighted fare for




Where class 1 is the highest valued class Dx is mean demand for any class x.
In the above formulation, r,,n is the aggregated demand for class i and higher. It is
the sum of mean demands for class i and all classes above class i. P(ry,,> S) is the
probability that the combined demand for class i and higher would be greater than S seats.
This probability would depend upon the aggregated standard deviation. The aggregated
standard deviation is computed as the square root of the sum of variance of the individual
standard deviations. Thus the aggregated standard deviation for the demands for class i




The results achieved through the EMSRb algorithm are even closer to the optimal
solution2.
In his dissertation, Belobaba had also mentioned the possibility of passenger shifts
under the case when the desired fare class is not available. He suggested that, given that
the lower class demand is reached, the expected marginal seat revenue should be increased
considering the probability of sell-up or vertical shift from the lower class passenger. For
a two class case, he suggested that given the booking limit for the lower class has been
reached, additional seats should be protected for the higher class till the following
condition holds true
EMSR1(7r1 2+ V2 1)*[1-P 2(v)] + P2(v)* fi = f2
[2.4]
Where
n1 2 = protection level for class 1 from the basic EMSRa formulation
V12 = additional seats protected for class 1 considering sell-up.
P2(v) = Probability that class 2 request would sell-up to class 1
fi = class 1 fare
f2= class 2 fare
A similar approach was suggested for more than two classes. This was the
first attempt to incorporate passenger sell-up in the EMSR algorithm. It recognized the
importance of passenger sell-up and suggested that the protection levels should be
2 Peter P. Belobaba, "EMSRa vs. EMSRb Explained: Does it make a Difference?", Presentation to the
PROS Users Conference, September 24-26, 1996.
increased to accommodate passengers willing to sell-up. This is the fundamental and most
important concept behind incorporating passenger sell-up in airline revenue management.
2.2 Belobaba & Weatherford3
In this model, Belobaba & Weatherford use the concept of a decision tree to model
the impact of passengers' decision (regarding sell-up) on overall revenue. To better
understand the model, consider a simple two-class case. We shall use the following
notation:
7= Protection level for class 1
B1: Probability that the next passenger is an original class-I passenger (i.e. he would not
request for class-2)
B2 : Probability that the next passenger would initially make a class-2 request but he may
sell-up to class-2, if class-2 is closed.
pi: Probability that the remaining seats would be enough for a all original class-I
passengers.
R1= Revenue from class 1
R2= Revenue from class 2
3 Peter P. Belobaba & Lawrence R. Weatherford, "Comparing Decision Rules that Incorporate Customer
Diversion in Perishable Asset Revenue Management Situations", Decision Sciences, Volume 27, Spring
1996.
The problem is to determine if we should increase the protection level for class-I
from 7c to (7c+ 1). The possible events along with their probabilities and the expected
incremental revenues are shown in the form of a decision tree in Figure 2.1.
7C1-p
vs- O
Figure 2.1: Decision Tree for two class case4
In Figure 2.1, the white boxes show the probability of each event, while the shaded
boxes show the incremental revenue under each event. From the decision tree, we see that
expected incremental revenue achieved by increasing the protection level is
B2*[pi*R 2 + (1-p1)*(R 2 - R1)] + B1*[pi*(R 2 - R1)] + (1-p1)*(R 2 - R1)]
Or simply
B2*p1*R1 + (R1 - R2)
To maximize revenue, we should increase the protection level till the incremental
revenue achieved is greater than zero. Thus we increase the protection level till
B2*pi > (R1 - R2)/R1
4 Peter P. Belobaba & Lawrence R. Weatherford, "Comparing Decision Rules that Incorporate Customer
Diversion in Perishable Asset Revenue Management Situations", Decision Sciences, Volume 27, Spring
1996.
By extending the above rule for n classes and combining it with the EMSRb
algorithm, the following optimality condition was developed.
R- . -R 1.. (SU....P(rc) = ", ,( ,-,i.
Ri.. -Ri..(1 - SU. ,.)
[2.5]
Where
P(710)= combined probability of selling the 7th seat in class-n or higher (including that
through sell-up
7n= protection level for class-n or higher
R1. = weighted average revenue from class-I through n
R1.,-i = revenue from the class immediately lower than n
SUn,1.n= probability of sell-up from class n+1 to n
Belobaba and Weatherford tested the above model under two different scenarios.
They found that the modified heuristic could result in additional gains up to 2% in overall
revenue when compared to that under the original EMSRb algorithm. They also
concluded that the extent of revenue gains was dependent upon the demand factor, the
number of fare classes or the fare ratio, and the sell-up rates. The largest gains were
observed under situations with high demand factors, high sell-up rates and large fare
ratios.
2.3 The missing variable
Both the above models address the issue of sell-up and make good intuitive sense.
However note that in both the approaches, the protection level is dependent upon the
following variables:
" The probability density of the higher class demand
* The fare-ratio
e The sell-up rate
To capture the sell-up potential, another important variable is the lower class
demand. The protection obtained from the above models would be the same irrespective
of the lower class demand. At any given protection level, sell-up rate, fare ratio and
expected class-I demand, the higher the expected class-2 demand, the more would be the
expected spill. The higher the expected spill, the more would be the expected sell-up.
The influence of lower class demand and spill, on passenger sell-up and overall revenue, is
described in detail in the next chapter.
2.4 Brumelle et al.5
Brumelle et al. developed a decision rule for a two class nested example that
maximizes total revenue. It was assumed that the demands for the two fare classes are not
' Brumelle, S.L., McGill, J.I., Oum, T.H., Sawaki, K., & Tretheway, M.W., "Allocation ofAirline Seats
between Stochastically Dependent Demands", Transportation Science, 1990, Vol. 24.
independent of each other. They recognized that a portion of the passengers that are
refused bookings in lower fare classes would sell-up or upgrade to the higher fare class,
thereby increasing the higher class demand.
They started with a simple seat allocation model with dependent demand and then
incorporated two important variants into it. The first one is related to the spill rate and
goodwill of full fare passengers. The second one is concerned with the possibility of
passenger up-grades or sell-up. For the simple seat allocation model with dependent
demands, they proposed the following condition to maximize revenue:




BL 2 = Booking limit for class 2
C = Capacity
S = any seat such that 1 S C
R1= Revenue from class 1
R2= Revenue from class 2
7c = Protection for class 1
The above model states that the optimal booking limit for class 2 is the maximum
number of seats under which the probability that class 1 demand exceeds the remaining
seats, given that class 2 demand is greater that the booking limit for class 2, is less than
the ratio of fares (RI/R 2). This model is the similar to the ones developed by Belobaba6 ,
Mayer7, Richter', Titze and Greisshaber9 , except that the demands of the two fare classes
are allowed to be stochastically dependent.
Brumelle et al. argued that airlines are very much concerned about the goodwill of
full fare passengers and the monetary loss of turning away a full fare passenger should be
more than the difference in fares. They suggested that a goodwill premium, RG should be
included with the revenue from the higher class. To incorporate this variant, They
suggested that the basic model be modified as follows:
BL2= Max [{0 S ir : P(Di > C - BL2)| D2 > BL2} < I(Ri +RG)
[2.7]
Brumelle et al. also recognized the possibility that a fraction of the passengers that
are refused seats in class 2 would sell-up to class 1. This translates to additional revenue
for airlines provided enough seats are protected for class I demand and the passengers
who might upgrade or sell-up. For the two class example, They proposed the following
modification of the basic model:
6 P.P. Belobaba, "Airline Yield Management: An Overview of Seat Inventory Control", Transportation
Science, 1987, Vol. 21.
M. Mayer. "Seat Allocation, or a Simple Model of Seat Allocation Via Sophisticated Ones", AGIFORS
Symp., Proc. 16, 1976.
8 H. Richter, "The Differential Revenue Method to Determine Optimal Seat Allotments by Fare Type",
AGIFORS Symp., Proc 22, 1982.
9 B. Titze and R. Greisshaber, "Realistic Passenger Booking Behaviors and the Simple Low Fare/High
Fare Seat A llotment Model", AGIFORS Symp., Proc. 23, 1983.
R 2 -SU *R1
BL2= Max [{0< Sf fr: P(Di+ U(BL2) >C-BL2)| D2 > BL2} < ](1-SU)*Ri
[2.8]
Here U(BL2) is the number of passengers that would upgrade or sell-up to the higher
class at booking limit BL 2. The expected value is the number of passengers spilled
multiplied by the sell-up rate. P(D1+ U(BL2)) is the joint probability distribution for class 1
demand and number of passengers selling up from class 2 to class 1.
Finally They suggested that the both the upgrade possibility and the goodwill
premium can be incorporated in the following model:
R2 -SU *RiBL2= Max [{O S ,r :P(Di + U(BL2)> C - BL2) I D2 BL2} < ]I-SU*R+(1-MI SU*(Ri + RG)~
[2.8]
The above model incorporates the sell-up potential into the optimality condition
for the two class case. Unlike previous models, it also considers lower class demand.
However, it is restricted to a two class case. It requires a joint probability distribution for
class 1 demand (D1) and the number of passengers selling up from class 2 to class 1
(U(BL2 )). For more than two classes, it would be too complex to have this joint probability
distribution. Suitable heuristics, which incorporate both sell-up rate and lower class
demand, might be more practical to implement.
2.5 Bohutinskyt
Bohuntinsky developed a strategy to study the existence of passenger sell-up and
its impact on overall revenue. Her study involved premature closure of certain fare classes
on specific flights. By premature closure, we mean closing a fare class before its usual
closing date. The resulting booking patterns (in flights that had premature closure) were
then compared with those that had no premature closing. Using these comparisons, she
was able to reach certain useful conclusions regarding passenger sell-up.
It was suggested that sell-up is dependent upon demand levels. An airline can
expect more instances of sell-up at higher demand levels. At lower demand levels, sell-up
is almost non-existent. This is in accordance with the fact that at higher demand levels, we
have more spill. Passengers would sell-up only when they are refused bookings in their
desired fare classes. At low demand factors, there is not much spill and most of the
passengers are able to secure reservations in their desired fare classes.
It was observed that sell-up rate varied with fare classes. Sell-up rate among
passengers of higher valued classes was more that that for low valued classes. Also, the
market dominance played an important role on the impact of sell-up in revenues. If a
market were heavily dominated by an airline, then passengers would be more willing to
sell-up. In case of competitive markets, many passengers would fly the competition
instead of selling up.
'0 Bohutinsky, Catherine H., "The Sell-up Potential ofAirline Demand", MS thesis, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology", June 1990.
Bohuntinsky's study is very important as it verifies the existence of sell-up among
passengers and proves its impact on revenue. Premature closing of fare classes is a
judgmental method and might be suitable to observe the extent of passengers' willingness
to sell-up under various market conditions. It should be noted that the approach tends to
be too aggressive to force sell-up among passengers. Premature closing of a fare class,
without a more explicit decision rule, may cause heavy spill and the revenue lost due to
spill may be more than the gains attributed to passenger sell-up. In order to incorporate
the effect of passenger sell-up in the seat inventory control process, it would be desirable
to have a mathematical model that closes a fare class after comparing the expected gain
with the expected loss.
In this chapter, we discussed past studies and attempts to incorporate passenger
sell-up in airline revenue management. A brief description of each of the strategies was
presented and relevant conclusions were discussed. The importance of various parameters
that effect passenger sell-up was also stressed. In the next chapter, we discuss the impact
of sell-up on optimal protection levels and propose another modified heuristic to
incorporate passenger sell-up in seat inventory control.
Chapter 3
Influence of Sell-up on Protection
Levels
In this chapter, we analyze the effect of sell-up on protection levels. We start by
evaluating the influence of sell-up on overall revenues. This gives us some useful
insights. Then we move to the deterministic example and establish an expression for the
optimal protection level under a two-class case. By deterministic, we mean that the
demand for each fare class is know with certainty. After the deterministic case, we move
to the stochastic case, dealing first with the distinct fare classes and then with the nested
fare classes. Under the stochastic case, the demand is expressed in terms of probability
distribution with a mean (average) and some standard deviation (measure of variance).
Recall that under the distinct or non-nested fare classes, a seat can only be sold to a class
for which it was initially allocated. However under the nested fare classes, a seat
protected for any class, can be sold to that class or any higher valued class. Finally, we
propose a modified heuristic to incorporate passenger sell-up.
3.1 Influence of Sell-up and Associated Variables on
Revenue
In this section, we illustrate the influence of sell-up rate, fare-ratios, demands and
protection levels on revenue. We take a simple example with two fare classes '1' and '2';
with 1 being the higher valued class. For simplicity, we shall assume deterministic
demands for each class. The total revenue under various values of protection, sell-up
rates, fare ratios and demand levels are determined. The base values of relevant variables
are assumed as follows:
Capacity, C = 100
Mean demand for class 1, Di = 50
Mean demand for class 2, D2 = 70
Class 1 fare, fi = $ 200
Class 2 fare, f2 = $ 100
Mean Sell-up rate, SU= 0.2
If '7c' is the number of seats allocated to class I then at any value of 7t, the total revenue
earned, 'RT', can be defined as
RT = R11 + R21 + R 2
= (revenue earned from original class 1 passengers)
+ (revenue earned from sell-up of passengers from class 2 to class 1)
+ (revenue earned from class 2 passengers that did not sell-up)
RT= fi*min[7c,Di] + fi* min[(7c-Di), max{O, (D2 - C + )* SU}]
+ f2*min[(C - 7c), D 2 ]
[3.1]
From the above expression, we observe that total revenue is influenced by
allocation level (7r), fare ratio (f2/fi), sell-up rate (SU), Demand levels (Di,D 2) and
capacity (C). However, even for a simple two class deterministic case, the effect of each
of these variables is not straightforward. For each seat allocated to class 1, there is
guaranteed revenue of fi, provided the allocation does not exceed class 1 demand. In
addition to this, there also exists a revenue potential due to the sell-up of class 2
passengers, provided the class 2 demand is more than the seats allocated to it and there
exists some sell-up. Finally a seat allocated to class 2 guarantees a revenue of f2,
provided the class 2 demand is not less than the seats allocated to it.
The following graphs show the relationship between the relevant variables and
total revenue. By comparing the revenue at various protection levels, we also get an idea
of the optimal protection level (the protection level for class 1 when the total revenue is
maximized). Note that the following graphs only illustrate the effect of sell-up rates,
demands and fare-ratio on the optimal protection level. In the next section, we derive an
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Figure 3.1: Impact of sell-up rate on revenue.
The optimal protection level increases with the increase in sell-up rate. This is
because of increase in number of people who would sell-up to the higher class. Also note
that under any sell-up rate greater than zero, the optimal protection level is greater than
the mean class 1 demand. Under a deterministic case the optimal protection level will
never be less than class 1 demand. Moreover, the higher the number of people who sell-
up, either due to spill or sell-up rate, the higher would be the optimal protection. Recall
that spill is the difference between the mean demand and seat allocation. It is the number
of requests that are refused.
An interesting phenomenon is observed when the sell-up rate becomes equal to
the fare ratio. In the above example when sell-up rate becomes equal to the fare-ratio
(i.e. 0.5), the optimal protection level lies anywhere from 70 to the total capacity. The
3.1.1 Sell-up Rate
--- I
reason of this is that within this range, the additional revenue achieved by protecting an
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Figure 3.2: Impact of fare ratio on revenue.
As the fare ratio decreases, i.e. the difference between the higher and lower class
fare increases, the total revenue at optimal protection level also increases. However,
surprisingly the optimal protection level remains the same and is independent of the fare
ratio. This is true for a deterministic case under the condition that the sell-up rate is less
than the fare ratio. If the sell-up rate is greater then the fare ratio, then the optimal
protection level goes to the maximum value i.e. capacity. The reason is that for each
incremental protection the revenue achieved through sell-up is greater than the class 2
fare.
3.1.3 Lower class demand
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Figure 3.3: Impact of demand factor on revenue.
The optimal protection level increases with the increase in class 2 demand. This
is because of higher spill, at a given 7c, that causes increased quantity of sell-up. Under a
scenario when there is no spill (i.e. the sum of demand for both classes is less than
capacity), variations in class 2 demand would not alter the optimal protection level.
3.1.4 Upper class demand
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16000
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Figure 3.4: Impact of higher class demand on revenue.
As class 1 demand increases, the optimal protection level also increases. Apart
from increased class 1 demand, the increase in protection level is also due to the higher
spill caused by rejecting more class 2 passengers. This can also be confirmed from the
above graph. When class 1 demand increases by 10 (from 50 to 60), the protection level
increases by around 13 (55 to 68).
3.2 Deterministic Case (two class)
Consider a case with two classes '1' and '2', with 1 being the higher valued class.
The goal is to develop a model for determining the optimal protection level for class 1
(which determines the booking limit for class two). We shall use jhe following notation:
fi: Fare value of class i.
7t: Protection for the class 1
C: Total capacity
D,: mean demand for class i.
SU: Sell up rate from class 2 to 1 (effective only when class 2 is closed)
SPi: Spill from class i
SC,: Spill cost for class i = fi * SPi
R,: Revenues from class i bookings.
3.2.1 Without considering sell up
In this section, we develop an expression for optimal protection level under the
assumption that there is no sell-up. In other words, none of the class 2 passengers that
are refused bookings (spilled), sell-up to class 1.
R= Revenues from original class 1 pax.
= fi*min[n,Di]
R2= Revenues from class 2 pax.
(where C-it = remaining capacity)
It is obvious that under this deterministic case, without considering sell up, the
optimal protection level is
7 = min [C, Di]
The reason is that class I fare is higher than class 2. The optimal protection level will
never be less than class I demand. The upper limit would be the capacity. The spill for
the lower class can be simply computed as the difference between class 2 demand and the
seats that are not protected for class 1. Note that there is no spill if class 2 demand is less
than the seats available to it. Mathematically
SP2 = max[O, {D2 - (C - t)}]
And spill cost
SC2 = SP2 * f2
= f2*max[O, {D2 - (C - 71)}]
3.2.2 Considering sell up
When we consider sell up, we would be protecting additional seats for the higher
class. By "additional", we mean the number of seats in addition to the ones that would be
protected without considering sell up under the optimal conditions.
Now:
R1= Revenues from original class 1 pax. + Revenues through sell-up
= f2*min[(C - 7r), D2]1
= R11 + R21
We can have the following three cases with respect to the protection level, 7c:
I) ,zc Di
If protection level is less than class 1 demand, the number of seats sold in class 1
would be equal to protection level. There would not be any additional revenue gain from
passengers who sell-up as the number of seats allocated to class 1 is not enough to
accommodate even the original class 1 passengers (the ones who do not buy class 1 as a
result of sell-up). Thus,
R1 = fi*(n) + 0
= fi *(71)
2) Di+ SP2 *SU >7r ' Di
Under this case, the protection level is greater than original class 1 demand but
less than the sum of class 1 demand and the number of passengers who sell-up from class
2 to class 1. Since the protection level is less than the total class 1 requests, i.e. the sum
of class 1 demand and the number of passengers who sell-up, the total number of
bookings in class I would be equal to the protection level. The total revenue from class 1
would thus be:
R1 = fi*Di + fi* (7t-D 1)
= fi*(7[)
3) rn_> Di + SP2*SU
Under this case the protection level is greater than the sum of class 1 demand and
number of passengers who sell-up to class 1. The total number of bookings in class 1
would thus be the sum of class 1 demand and the number of passengers who sell-up from
class 1 to class 2. In other words, all requests for class 1 (including those due to sell-up)
would generate revenue; however, there might be seats that are protected for class 1 but
remain empty. The revenue from class 1 can be computed as:
R1 = fi*Di + fi* SP2*SU
= fi*Di + fi* max{O, (D2 - C + n)*SU}
For all the above cases, the revenue from class 2 remains the same. It is the fare
times the number of seats that are not protected for class 1, provided class 2 demand is
higher than the number of seats available. If the number of seats available is more than
class 2 demand, the revenue from class 2 is the demand times class 2 fare.
R2 = Revenues from class 2
= f2*min[(C - 7c), D 2 ]
Also Spill cost, at protection level 7t
SC2 = f2* SP2
= f2 * max[O, {D 2 - (C - t)}]
For revenue maximization, we set the protection level such that the spill cost
caused by protecting additional class 1 seats is less than the additional revenue achieved.
As mentioned above, by additional seats we mean all the seats protected in addition to
that under no sell up or in addition to D1. Now from above expressions for R1, R2 and
Spill Cost, we see that:
Additional revenue from protecting (7r- DI) seats is:
1) = 0 (if ;r =DI)
2) = f1* (7t-D 1) (if (D1+ SP2 *SU)>--> DI)
3) = fi*max[0, (D2 - C + 7t)]*SU (if r_> DI + SP2 *SU)
Note that by additional spill cost, we mean the increase in spill cost due to the
increase in protection level by considering sell-up, i.e.
Additional Spill cost = (Total Spill Cost) - (Spill Cost without considering sell up)
There could be two cases:
1) If class 2 demand is greater than the seats that are not protected for class 1.
Additional Spill cost = f2*max[O, {D 2 - (C - )}] - f2*max[0, {D 2 - (C - Di))]
= f2*(c - Di) {if D2 > (C - t)}
2) If class 2 demand is less than the seats that are not protected for class 1 then there
would be no spill and thus no spill cost.
Optimal 7r is the value at which additional revenue is greater than or equal to the
additional spill cost. There would be two main scenarios:
1) Sell-up rate is greater than fare ratio
Under this case the protection level is the maximum possible value which is the
capacity. For every seat protected there is a revenue gain of fi*SU against a loss of f2




Hence the revenue gain would always be greater than the loss and the optimal protection
level would simply be the capacity. However, this is an unrealistic case as the sell-up
rate is usually less than the fare-ratio.
2) Sell-up rate is less than fare ratio
Under this case, the optimal protection level would never be less than class 1
demand plus the number of people that would sell-up at that protection level. The sum of
class 1 demand and sell-up, (Dj+ SP2 *SU), is the deterministic number of passengers
that would buy the higher fare, once the booking limit on the lower fare is reached. From
now onwards, we shall refer to this value as "combined" class 1 requests. If we are
protecting one less seat than the final class 1 requests, then there is a guaranteed loss of fi
versus a gain of f2 or less. Since fi>f 2, the protection level would always be below this
threshold value.
Again protecting one more seat than the final class 1 requests means a loss of f2
against a gain of fi*SU. Since the sell-up rate is less than the fare ratio
SU<f 2/fi
fi*SU< f2
Hence we conclude that for revenue maximization under the two-class
deterministic case, the optimal protection level is such that
7= Di + SP2*SU
7= Di + max[O, {D2 - (C- D1)}*SU]
[3.2]
From the above relationship, we observe that the optimal protection level is
dependent upon the sell-up rate, demand levels and capacity. It is independent of the fare
ratio if sell-up rate is less than the fare ratio. Recall that if sell up rate is greater than the
fare ratio than the optimal protection level is equal to capacity. Note that these conditions
are true only for the deterministic case where we have a guaranteed final class 1 requests
(including the number of sell-ups). For the stochastic case, we have to follow an iterative
procedure and set the protection level to the point where additional revenue obtained
through sell-up is greater than or equal to the additional spill cost. Under stochasticity,
we calculate the additional revenue in terms of expected values. At this point the fare
ratio pays a very important role as the difference between the additional revenue through
protection and spill cost would be highly dependent upon it.
The following graphs show the effect of sell-up rates and demand levels on
optimal protection under the two-class deterministic case. By comparing the optimal
protection level at the demand levels assumed in the previous section, we can also check
the validity of the above expression for optimal protection level. Unless stated otherwise,
we shall use the following base values.
fi: Fare value of class 1 = $200
f2: Fare value of class 2 = $100
f2/fi: Fare Ratio = 0.5
C: Total capacity = 100
D1 : mean demand for class 1 = 50
D2 : mean demand for class 2 = 70











40 50 60 70 80 90
Class 1 Demand
Figure 3.5: Impact of higher class demand on optimal protection.
The above graph shows the relationship between optimal protection levels and
class 1 demand. As mentioned in the previous section, for any increase in class 1
demand, the increase in protection level is higher than that of class 1 demand (provided
there is some sell-up). The reason is increased spill from class 2 that causes more
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Figure 3.6: Impact of lower class demand on optimal protection
The above graph shows the relationship between optimal protection level and
class 2 demand, holding class 1 demand equal to 50. As class 2 demand increases, the
optimal protection level for class 1 also increases (provided there is spill). The increase
in optimal protection level is highly dependent upon the sell-up rate. At any spill, the
higher the sell-up rate, the more would be the number of passengers willing to buy the
higher fare and thus greater would be the optimal protection level. In fact, for a
deterministic case, the optimal protection level rises by sell-up rate for every unit increase
in class 2 demand. The above graphs also confirms that the value of optimal protection
level determined by our expression matches the ones determined indirectly through the
revenue graphs in the previous section.
3.3 Stochastic Case (two class)
In this section, we shall extend the previous approach for stochastic cases. The
basic approach remains the same: Protect seats for the higher class as long as the
additional revenue gain is greater than the additional spill cost. We shall first consider
distinct fare classes and establish a condition for revenue maximization. Then we shall
move to nested fare classes.
The following notation will be used
fi: Fare value of class i.
S,: Seat allocation for class i (under distinct fare classes)
7ti: Protection for class 1 to i (under nested fare classes)
C: Total capacity
Di: Expected (mean) demand for class i.
ri: a random variable representing the stochastic demand for class-i
p(ri): probability distribution function for class-i demand.
Fi(x): cumulative probability of having at most x bookings in class-i
P(r;>x) = Probability that class-i demand is greater than x, = 1 - Fi (x)
a01: Standard deviation for class-i demand.
SUji: Expected sell-up rate from class j to i (effective only when class-j is closed)
SPi: Expected Spill from class-i
Ei: Expected revenues from final class-i bookings.
ET: Total expected revenue from all classes.
3.3.1 Distinct fare classes
Under distinct fare classes, the aim is to determine the seat allocation that would
maximize the overall revenue. For distinct fare classes, we assume that the seats
allocated for a fare class cannot be purchased by any other class, even if the fare value of
the other class is more than that for the class for which the seat was allocated. In terms of
mathematical modeling it means that we do no need to consider the probability that seats
allocated for lower classes might be purchased by a higher class even if the higher class
demand exceeds the allocation level. Consider a simple case with two classes '1' and '2';
with class 1 being the higher valued class.
a) Without considering sell-up
If Si seats are allocated for class 1, expected revenue from class 1 bookings is
Si
Ei = Yfi * P(rl x)
X=1
Similarly, expected revenue from class 2 booking is
C-Sl-l
E2 = Ef2* P(r2 x)
x=p
Total expected revenue at any allocation level S, is
x=S1 C-S1-1




At any allocation level Si, expected revenue from class 1 bookings
= expected revenue from original class 1 passengers
+ expected revenue from sell-up (due to spill)
Ei= Ell + E21
As done in the above section, expected revenue from the original class 1 passengers
x=SI
Eii=fi* ZP(r, i x)
x=1
Note that by original class 1 passengers, we mean those who directly make a request for
class 1 (excluding the ones who request it only if class 2 is closed)
Expected revenue from sell-up = (Spill from class 2) * (Sell-up rate) *
(Probability that there are enough seats to accommodate sell-up)




Here 'y' represents the seats that are not protected for class 1. The term P(C-y-J <
r, < C-y) refers to the probability that the demand for class 1, a random variable r,, would
be equal to (C-y) seats. The summation of these probabilities, with 'y' varying from 1 to
'x', would actually give us the probability that class 1 demand is less than (C-x). Thus we
substitute the internal summation by a single term P(r, C-y). Intuitively, we are
summing the probability of all events under which there is sell-up and the passengers
who sell-up, occupy those seats which would not be sold to an original class 1 passenger.
Now expected revenue from final class I bookings (including sell-up)
x=S x=0
El = fi* I{P(ri x)+fi.* I P(r2 X X)* SU2n * P{rI <(C -x)}
x=1 x=C-SI
[3.4]





And total expected revenue at any allocation level Si is
ET = Ei + E2
x=S1 x=ao x=C-SI-1
= fi *{P(ri x)+fi * Z P(r2 > x)*SU21 *P{ri <(C-x)}+f2* 1 P(r2 x)
x=1 x=C-SI x=1
[3.6]
The following graph shows the change in total expected revenue under various
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Figure 3.7: Total expected revenues under distinct fare classes.
From Figure 7, we observe that the optimal protection level, under the given fare
ratio and sell-up rate, is 56.
Condition for Revenue Maximization (distinctfare classes)
To maximize the total revenue under stochastic case, for distinct fare classes, we
protect seats for the higher class till the expected revenue of each incremental seat
protected for the higher class is greater than the expected loss due spill.
We introduce some new notations
R, = Additional expected revenue from original class 1 passengers (excluding sell-
up) due to incremental protection
R21= Additional expected revenue from sell-up by incremental protection
Ri= The total additional expected revenue from final class 1 bookings due to
incremental protection
R22= Expected revenue from class 2 without incremental protection.
Now if the protection level is increased from (S-1) to S,
R= fi * {(Probability of selling the St' seat to an original class 1 passenger)
= fi * P(ri>S)
R21 = change in total expected revenue through sell-up
= (expected rev. through sell-up at allocation level S)
- (expected rev. through sell-up at allocation level S-1)
= f1 * ZP(r2 x)* SU2* P{r1 <(C - x)} - f* ZP(r2 x)* SU 2 * P{r <(C- x)}
x=C-SI x=C-SI-I
= * [P{r2 (C - S)} * SU1 * P{1 < (C - x)}]
Now total expected gain is
Ri= R11 + R21
= fi * P(ri S) + fi*[P{r 2 (C-S)}*SU 2 1]
[3.7]
and the expected loss (i.e. the expected revenue if the seat is allocated to class 2)
R22 = f2*P(r 2>C-S)
= f2* {1-F 2(C-S)}
[3.8]
We protect the maximum number of seats as long as the following condition
holds true
fi *[P(r1 S)] + fi*[P{r 2>(C-S)}*SU21] 2 f2*[P{r 2 (C-S)}]
[3.9]
Hence for our two class stochastic case, under the assumption of distinct fare classes,
the optimal protection level depends upon
e Probability of selling the fare to a original class 1 passenger which in turn depends
upon class I demand
e Sell-up rate
e Fare ratio
* Incremental Spill, which in turn depends upon class 2 demand
Note that in the above condition, for each incremental protection, we consider the
incremental expected spill, which in turn depends upon total class 2 demand. The higher
the class 2 demand, the more is the spill, and more would be the protection. Figure 3.8
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Figure 3.8: Incremental expected revenues under distinct fare classes
The optimal protection level is the seat at which the incremental expected revenue
becomes equal to expected revenue of that seat from class 2. The optimal protection
level is the 56t seat. This value matches the one obtained through the total revenue
curve. Note that without considering sell-up, the optimal protection level would have
been the 50th seat.
3.3.2 Nested fare classes
Under nested fare classes, the aim is to determine the protection level for upper
classes that would maximize the revenue. The mathematical modeling is more complex
than that for the distinct case. We have to consider the probability that the demand for
the higher class may exceed the protection level and may take up seats that are not sold to
the lower class passengers. As before, consider a case with two classes '1' and '2'; with
class 1 being the higher valued class. From Curry's' approach, the total expected
revenue, ignoring sell-up, can be expressed as:
C-fr C-riJdr2p(r2)[f2r2 + f drip(ri){firi} + fi;fj drip(ri)]
0 0 x
+[f2(C - I)+ jdrip(ri)(firi)] * jdr2p(r2)
0 C-x
The above expression is very complex. Even for a two class case, it involves
double integrals. As the number of classes increases, so do the number of integrals.
Nevertheless, it gives us a very good insight regarding the calculation of expected
revenues from each class under a nested case. We have to consider the probability that
the higher class demand might increase the protection level and may take up seats that are
not sold to the lower class. Considering this fact, the expected revenues Ell, E21 and E2,
can be redefined for the nested case as follows:
El= Expected revenues from original class 1 passenger (excluding sell-up)
'ri C X
= fi *[E{P~r > }+ {P(r >x)}*{P(C-y-1<r2 < C-y)}]
Zl C
=fi *[Z{P(ri > x}+ 2{P(ri > x)}*{P(r2 < C - x)}]
x=1 x=;T [3.10]
Where i, is the protection level for class 1





Renwick E. Curry, "Optimal Airline SeatAllocation with Fare Classes Nested by Origins and
Destinations", Transportation Science, Vol. 24, No. 3, August 1990.




Note that, in the above expressions we have assumed that class 2 passengers book
first. As for the distinct case, the total expected revenue at any protection level could be
expressed as the sum of the above expected revenues.
ET= E11+ E21+ E22
SE 1 + E22
[3.13]
The following graph shows the change in total expected revenue under various















Figure 3.9: Total expected revenues under nested fare classes.
Note the difference between the above curves and those under the case of distinct
fare classes. At low protection levels, the expected revenue from the higher class (and
subsequently the total revenue) is much higher than that under the distinct case. The
reason is the ability to sell unprotected seats to the higher class (if they are not sold to the
lower class). The optimal protection level is the 540 seat. It is below that under the
distinct case. The reason is the increase in expected revenue from an unprotected seat
due to the possibility of selling it to a higher class. Recall that under the distinct fare




Condition for Revenue Maximization (nested fare classes)
For revenue maximization, we protect seats for the higher class as long as the
incremental expected revenue for any seat, under protection, is more than the incremental
expected revenue without protecting the seat for the higher class. The incremental
expected revenue by protecting the seat for the higher class can be expressed as
R1= Additional expected revenue through incremental protection.
= (Expected revenue Ei at protection level S)
- (Expected revenue Ei at protection level S-1)
From equations 3.7 & 3.9, we get
R1= fi*P(r1>S) - fi*P(ri>S)*P(r 2<C-S) + fi*P(r2>C-S)*SU21*P(ri<S)
[3.14]
In the above expression,
fi P(r 'S) refers to the incremental expected revenue if the protected seat is sold to an
original class 1 passenger.
fi *P(r1 S) *P(r2<C-S) refers to the expected revenue if the seat is not protected for class
1 but the Sth class 1 request is still fulfilled by unprotected seat (the term is subtracted to
get the net effect of incremental protection).
fi *P(r2>C-S) *SU2 *P(r<S) refers to the incremental expected revenue through sell-up
Again, the loss under incremental protection (or the expected revenue if the seat is
sold to a class 2 passenger) is
R2= f2 * P(r 2>C-S)




fi*P(r1>S) - fi*P(r1>S)*P(r 2<C-S) + fi*P(r2>C-S)*SU 21*P(ri<S) 2 f2 * P(r2>C-S)
[3.15]
Note the difference between equation 3.15 (nested fare classes) and equation 3.9
(distinct fare classes). The incremental expected revenue by protecting an additional seat
under nested fare classes is reduced by two possibilities. The first one is the possibility
that even an unprotected seat could be sold to class 1, if it has not been sold to class 2.
The second factor is related to sell-up. It is possible that class 1 demand is such that all
protected seats would be sold to class 1, even without sell-up. In other words there is no
additional revenue gain through sell-up if the passengers who sell-up occupy those seats
that would have been otherwise sold to class 1.
The following graph shows the change in incremental expected revenues as we
increase the protection level. The optimal protection level is the 54*" seat. This matches












Figure 3.10: Incremental expected revenues under nested fare classes.
Again the curve for R1 (expected additional revenue from incremental protection)
is much different from that under the case of distinct classes, particularly under low
protection levels. The reason is the ability to sell an unprotected seat to the higher class.
For example the incremental expected revenue from protecting 6 seats instead of 5, out of
a total of 100 seats, is not significant. Considering the mean class 2 demand (70), it is
very likely that even if the 6th seat is not protected, it would not be sold to class 2 and
would be available when class 1 passenger appears. The incremental expected revenue
increases with the increase in protection level, reaches a maximum value and then again
diminishes. For example the incremental expected revenue by protecting 41 seats instead
of 40 is quite significant. The reason is that if the 4 1" seat is not protected, then based on
mean demands of class 1 (50) and class 2 (70) it is likely that the seat would be sold to
class 2 and the 4 1s' class 1 passenger turns up but is refused. The value of this
incremental expected revenue is further enhanced by the fact that additional protection
causes additional spill from class 2, which in turn causes additional number of people to
sell-up to the higher class. Again the incremental spill at higher value of total protection
is more than that under a lower value of total protection. This leads us to a very
important point; the incremental expected revenue for protecting an additional seat is not
only dependent upon the demand distribution and sell-up rate, but also on total protection
level or booking limits.
3.4 Generalized heuristic for multiple classes
Consider the case with n classes, with class 1 being the highest valued class and
class n being the lowest valued class. Let class i be any intermediate class. According to
the EMSRb heuristic, the overall revenue would be maximized if we protect maximum
number of seats for class i (and higher) as long as the following condition holds true
fii*P(ri,i>S) > fj
Here
j = i + I (next lower valued class after class i)




D, = mean demand for class x
ri,n = aggregated demand from class 1 to i
The above heuristic is very practical and has been successfully used by the airline
industry. Here, we shall attempt to incorporate the sell-up potential in this heuristic.
From our analysis in Section 3.2, we have seen that it is desirable to increase the
protection level when there exists sell-up. The question is how much additional
protection should we have? When we protect an additional seat in the hope of sell-up
there are two possibilities:
" A lower class passenger, who is spilled out, decides to sell-up and buys the higher
fare. In this case, the airline realizes revenue equal to the higher fare.
* None of the spilled out passengers, if any, decide to buy the higher fare and the seat
remains unsold. In this case the airline loses revenue equal to the lower fare,
assuming that the seat would have been sold to the lower valued fare class. Note that
this assumption is consistent with the assumptions associated with the EMSRb
heuristic.
The revenue would be maximized if we protect seats till the expected gain in
revenue through additional protection is more than the expected loss. Lets assume that
we have determined the protection levels using the EMSRb heuristic. For any class i
(and higher), the protection level is 7q. The expected gain for protecting an additional
seat (in addition to the protection level obtained from the EMSRb algorithm) is the
product of the probability of passenger sell-up from the next lower class and the fare for
class i. Assuming that the seat, if not protected, would be sold to the next lower class, the
expected loss is the fare of the next lower class. Thus, to maximize revenue, we continue
to protect additional seats till the following condition holds true:
fi*P(sell-up, 7t; ) >! f]
Here 'j' is the next lower class after class i. P(sell-up, rr) is the probability that
the additional seats protected in the hope of sell-up would be sold to passengers that are
spilled out from the next lower class and are willing to sell-up. This probability would
depend upon the mean or the expected number of passengers that would sell-up from
class j to class i. The expected number of passengers willing to sell-up is the product of
the number of passengers spilled and the mean sell-up rate. Note that for a given number
of passengers willing to sell-up, the probability of sell-up reduces as we increase the
number of passengers. In other words the expected revenue associated with passenger
sell-up reduces as we protect more and more additional seats. The idea is very much
similar to the original EMSRb heuristic. We are protecting additional seats for a certain
demand. The protection levels are determined on the basis of expected revenues with and
without protection. It is interesting that the demand here is the expected sell-up and
depends upon the booking limits determined by the EMSRb algorithm itself
The proposed heuristic rule can now be summarized as follows:
e Use the original EMSRb algorithm to determine the protection levels for each
class.
* Determine the expected spill from each class. The expected spill is the
difference between the mean demand and the seats available to that class.
Note that under the nested fare structure, the higher class passengers have
access to all lower fare seats. However, it is assumed that lower class book
before the higher class and only the seats protected for the higher class would
be available to them.
For each fare class,
- Determine the expected number of passengers willing to sell-up. It is the
product of expected spill and mean sell-up rate. Assume that the expected
number of passengers willing to sell-up has a normal distribution with
standard deviation equal to
Z*4(mean)
Here 'Z' is the coefficient of standard deviation. It is a measure of
variability.
> For passenger = 1 to (expected number of sell-up)
+ Increase protection level if
f 1+ *P(sell-up)>f3
Here
fi+1 is the fare of the next higher class.
P(sell-up) is the probability that the number of passengers
selling up would be more than the additional seats protected.
* Continue to increase the protection level as long as the above
expression is true.
It must be mentioned here that this is a heuristic and would not give optimal
values of protection levels. However, we do expect that the protection levels achieved
through the above approach would capture the sell-up potential and increase the revenue
potential by adjusting the protection levels in accordance with changes in sell-up rate and
expected demands.
In this chapter, we explained the impact of sell-up on protection levels that
maximize revenue. We started with a simple deterministic example and used it to
illustrate the influence of sell-up on overall revenue. Then we derived the expression for
optimal protection level under a two class deterministic case and showed the effects of
various variables on the value of optimal protection level. After getting some insight into
the influence of sell-up on optimal protection levels, we moved to the stochastic case and
dealt with the nested and the non-nested cases. For the stochastic case, we developed a
heuristic that helps us to determine the protection levels that would maximize revenue. It
was emphasized that although the heuristic does not give optimal protection levels,
however, it is a good approximation to capture the effect of sell-up. In the next chapter,
we describe a simulation that uses this heuristic and discuss the results.
Chapter 4
Simulation
Simulation is the procedure in which a computer-based mathematical model of a
physical system is used to perform experiments on that system by generating external
demands and observing how the system reacts to the demands over a period of time2
Simulation is a very effective tool in measuring the performance of heuristics,
particularly when we are dealing with complexities like uncertainties in demands and
passenger behavior. In this chapter, we use simulation to observe the performance of the
EMSRb heuristic and its modifications under various scenarios. We will primarily be
concerned with the abilities of the heuristics to capture the revenue associated with
passenger sell-up. A simulation software is developed for this purpose. The initial part
of the chapter describes the simulation environment and the assumptions associated with
it. In the latter part, we simulate different cases and discuss the results.
4.1 Why Simulation?
The modified heuristic described in the previous chapter seems promising in
capturing the revenue potential associated with the sell-up phenomenon. It adjusts the
2 R. C. Larson and A. R. Odoni. "Urban Operations Research ", Prentice-Hill, Inc., 1967.
protection levels obtained through the original EMSRb algorithm by considering the
expected revenue associated with sell-up. It does not protect additional seats if the
expected revenue through sell-up is less than the next lower fare. Theoretically, it
ensures that there is little risk of overprotection and the overall revenue under the
modified rule should not be less than the one under the original EMSRb algorithm.
However, there is no guarantee that the booking limits obtained through the proposed rule
would always result in more revenue as compared to that under the original EMSRb
heuristic. As mentioned before, the proposed rule is a heuristic attempt to capture the
revenue associated with passenger sell-up. The stochastic demand, multiple fare classes
and most importantly, the nested fare structure makes the problem too complex to
analytically measure the effectiveness of the proposed rule under various conditions.
Simulation is a suitable solution to this problem. By simulating the booking process
under various scenarios, we can analyze the performance of the original as well as the
proposed heuristic rules.
4.2 Overview of Simulation Program
Figure 4.1 shows the overall simulation process. Here we give a brief description of each
step.
_101i'liIji
For iteration i, booking period p
e Determine Protection Levels/Booking Limits
using the specified RM algorithm
e Use assumed sell-up rate for modified rules.
* Generate requests for current period
qussfrcrrnIro n
If end of iterations, generate
results
If requests for current period
is over, go to next period.
If end of periods, go to next
.- iteration.
passenger at a time
If accepted, process next
-- request.
Figure 4.1: The Simulation process.
INPUTS
e Fare class, periods, etc.
* Mean demand & Coeff. of Std. Dev.
" Sell up (assumed and actual)
* RM algorithm
eRequest seat in desired fare class
eAccept or reject request based of Booking limits
If rejected,
e Check if passenger is willing to sell-up based on
actual sell-up rate.
e Book the passenger in higher class if the




The first step is to gather the input data. The simulation requires information
regarding the fare classes, booking periods, mean demands for each fare class under each
period, sell-up rates, demand factors and number of iterations to be simulated. The
beginning of each booking period is also the revision point for determining the booking
limits. By revision, we mean the recalculation of booking limits through the revenue
management algorithm considering the expected future demands. The higher the number
of booking periods, the greater would be the number of booking limit revisions done by
the simulation and the better would be the resulting booking limits. However, for each
booking period, we need to have an estimate of mean demand for each fare class for that
period. Since forecasting for very small time periods is difficult and inaccurate, the
number of booking periods should be such that we have a reasonable estimate of mean
demands during that period.
For each fare class, two sell-up rates are defined. One is considered as the
"assumed sell-up rate " while the other one is considered as the "actual sell-up rate ".
The assumed sell-up rate is used by the revenue management algorithm in determining
the protection levels whereas the actual sell-up rate is used during the processing of each
request. The idea is to analyze the situation when there are differences in the sell-up rates
assumed by the airline and actual sell-up rates existing in the market. The mean sell-up
rate supplied as input refers to buying the next higher valued fare. It is assumed that sell-
up will occur between adjacent classes only.
Finally, the number of iterations determine the number of times we want to
simulate the same departure case. The end results are generated as the mean of all
iterations. The higher the number of iterations, the higher would be the reliability of the
results.
4.2.2 Protection Levels
For determining the protection levels, we need to have an estimate of the expected
demands in the future. We assume that the demand for each fare class, for each period, is
normally distributed with a mean "p" and standard deviation "a". The mean demands for
each period are given as input. The standard deviation is estimated as
a = Z*4p
Here "Z" is the Z-factor. It is the coefficient that refers to the variability in demands. For
our examples, we would assume a value of 1.0. The reason is that we will be using the
Poisson distribution to generate the demand. In a Poisson distribution, the standard
deviation is equal to the square root of the mean.
Once we have an estimate of mean demands and standard deviations, we can use
a revenue management algorithm for determining the protection levels. In our
simulation, we have a choice of three heuristics:
1. EMSRb: This is the original EMSRb algorithm as proposed by BelobabaI. We
start with the highest valued fare class and keep on protecting seats as long as the
expected marginal seat revenue (EMSR) from the combined higher classes is
greater than or equal to the fare for the next lower class. Except for the highest
valued class, we consider aggregate values of demand and fare. For example if
there are 'n' classes and 'i' and 'j' are two intermediate classes with 'j' being the
next immediate lower valued class after class 'i', then according to this heuristic
rule, we keep on protecting seats for the classes 'i' and higher till the aggregated
EMSR value for any seat 'S' is higher than the next lower class fare.
Mathematically this condition is written as:
EMSR(Si) > Rj
Here
EMSR(Si) = R1,i * P(Si)
R1,i is the aggregated fare for classes i and higher
P(Si) is the probability that the sum of requests for class i and higher would be
more than the S seats.
Rj is the fare for class j
The approach used to determine the aggregated fares has been explained
in Section 2.1.
Peter P. Belobaba, "Optimal vs. Heuristic Methods for Nested Seat Allocation ", Presentation to the
AGIFORS Yield Management Study Group, Brussels, May 1992.
2. EMSRb2: This is the modified rule proposed by Belobaba and Weatherford 2 . As
with the original EMSRb algorithm, it starts with the highest valued class and
keeps on protecting seats as long as the expected marginal seat revenue from the
higher classes is greater than or equal to the fare for the next lower class.
However, the EMSR value for the higher class is modified to incorporate sell-up.
For any two classes 'i' and 'j', with class i being the higher valued class, the
modified rule is:
R1,i(l-SUj,;)*P(Si) - R1 ,; (SUj,;) > Rj
Here
SUj, is the mean assumed sell-up rate from class j to class i.
This rule has been discussed in detail in Section 2.2
3. EMSRb3: This is the new proposed rule. Under this rule, we first determine the
protection levels and booking limits using the original EMSRb algorithm. Using
the booking limits and expected demands, we determine the expected spill from
each class. The expected number of passengers willing to sell-up is the product of
expected spill and mean sell-up rate (assumed sell-up rate). We now adjust the
protection levels considering the expected number of passengers who would be
willing to sell-up. For each class, we increase the protection level as long as the
expected revenue from sell-up is more than the next lower fare. It is assumed that
2 Peter P. Belobaba & Lawrence R. Weatherford. "Comparing Decision Rules that Incorporate Customer
Diversion in Perishable Asset Revenue Management Situations", Decision Sciences, Volume 27, Spring
1996.
the number of passengers willing to sell-up has a normal distribution with a mean
ps. and a standard deviation as..
where u= Z* SU
Here we use the same Z-factor value as that for the mean input
demands. This implies that the relationship between standard deviation and mean
is same for both mean input demands and the number of passengers willing to
sell-up. The proposed rule has been described in detail Section 3.4.
4.2.3 Generation of Requests
For each fare class, we assume that the passengers arrive as a Poisson process and
the requests are generated as a Poisson distribution. Based on previous studies doney
Williamson 3 and Lee4 , the assumption of Poisson distribution is reasonable. After the
booking limits have been revised, we generate the requests for all fare classes. The
values are stored as the actual requests received during the period. Note that the requests
generated for each period are isolated from the process of booking limit revision, which
is solely based upon the mean demands supplied as inputs.
' Elizabeth L. Williamson, "Airline Network Seat Inventory Control: Methodologies and Revenue
hnpacts ", Ph. D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, June 1992.
4 A. 0. Lee, "Airline Reservations Forecasting: Probabilistic and Statistical Models ofthe Booking
Process ", Ph. D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, Sept. 1990.
4.2.4 Processing of Requests
Once we have generated the actual requests during a period, we process each
request, one at a time. It is assumed that during each period, the lower class requests
always arrive before the upper class ones. This assumption may not be always be true,
however, if we have a large number of booking periods, the error if any, is not
significant. The reason is that on one hand, the number of requests for each booking
period reduces as we increase the number of booking periods, and on the other hand, the
booking limits are reevaluated at the beginning of each period.
In our simulation, for each period, we start with the processing of requests for the
lowest valued class and move to the higher valued classes. Each request is handled
according to the following process:
1. Check if seat is available in the desired class.
2. If seat is available, book the passenger and reduce the availability and booking
limits.
3. If seat is not available, check if the current passenger is willing to sell-up. To
decide whether the current passenger is willing to sell-up or not, we perform a
Bernoulli trial using the mean sell-up rate for the class (as supplied in inputs).
The sell-up rate used here is the "actual" sell-up rate and may differ from the one
assumed during the determination of protection levels.
4. If the current passenger is willing to sell-up, book him in the next higher class and
reduce the availability and booking limits accordingly.
5. If the current passenger is not willing to sell-up, he is spilled out of the system.
As mentioned before, we are only considering sell-up between adjacent fare
classes.
4.2.5 Results
The results are recorded in three different files. The first one presents a summary
for all iterations. It records the mean values for overall revenue, loads, load factor,
requests for each fare class, spill and number of passengers who sold up to higher classes.
The second one records these parameters for each iteration. The third one keeps track of
the revision of protection levels and booking limits under each period. This information
helps in comparing the difference in protection levels under the different types of revenue
management techniques used.
4.3 Test Cases
In this section we study the performance of the three heuristics. Two test
scenarios have been built for this purpose. Both scenarios consider a single leg example.
4.3.1 Scenario 1
This is a small three-class example. Table 4.1 presents the mean demand and fare
for each class. These values are valid for all cases tested under Scenario 1.





Table 4.1: Scenario 1 parameters.
There are 18 booking periods and the demand factors (demand/capacity) range
from 0.8 to 1.5. The capacity of the aircraft is 150. In order to test the performance of
the original EMSRb algorithm and the modified rules, we tested the above scenario under
various values of sell-up rates. The following cases were developed:
Base Case: Sell-up does not exist. Both assumed as well as actual sell-up rates are given
as 0.
Case 1: There is moderate sell-up and the actual sell-up rate among passengers is equal
to the assumed sell-up rate in the EMSRb decision rules.
Case 2: There is heavy sell-up. Again, the actual sell-up rate among passengers is equal
to the assumed sell-up rate.
For each case, we simulated 500 iterations. The results presented here are the
mean values over 500 iterations.
4.3.1.1 Base Case
Under the base case, we assume that there is
EMSRb algorithm to control the booking limits and
when there is no sell-up, both the modified rules are
algorithm and we get the same protection levels and
no sell-up. We use the original
observe its performance. Note that
reduced to the original EMSRb
thus same results. The results can be
observed in Table 4.2.
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
0.8 79.96 39908 1 36.03 35.86 35.85 0.01 0
2 38.44 38.57 38.57 0 0
3 45.65 45.54 45.53 0.01 0
0.9 89.51 44705 1 40.54 40.38 40.28 0.1 0
2 43.24 43.11 42.92 0.19 0
3 51.35 51.7 51.07 0.63 0
1 95.86 48700 1 45.04 45.14 44.48 0.66 0
2 48.05 48.29 47.44 0.86 0
3 57.06 56.97 51.87 5.1 0
1.1 97.42 51398 1 49.54 49.51 48.4 1.12 0
2 52.86 52.91 51.33 1.57 0
3 62.77 63.15 46.4 16.75 0
1.2 98.04 54401 1 54.05 54.77 53.35 1.42 0
2 57.66 57.66 55.56 2.11 0
3 68.47 68.52 38.15 30.36 0
1.3 97.82 56660 1 58.55 58.55 57.07 1.48 0
2 62.47 62.65 59.78 2.87 0
3 74.18 73.7 29.88 43.82 0
1.4 97.53 59149 1 63.06 62.54 61.19 1.36 0
2 67.27 67.42 64.47 2.95 0
3 79.88 80.35 20.63 59.72 0
1.5 97.69 62088 1 67.56 67.89 66.15 1.73 0
2 72.08 72.3 68.92 3.37 0
1_ 1_ _ 1_ _ 3 85.59 85.25 11.46 73.79 0
Table 4.2: Scenario 1, Base Case.
As expected, the EMSRb heuristic does a very good job in limiting the lower
valued class passengers and protecting seats for the higher valued class passengers. At
lower demand factors, there are enough seats and there is no benefit of using EMSRb to
impose the booking limits. However, as the demand factor increases, the overall revenue
is highly influenced by the booking limits. If enough seats are not protected for the
higher valued class passengers then there is a risk of spilling too many of them. On the
other hand, if too many seats are protected for the higher class passengers, then there is a
risk of having too many empty seats. As evident from Table 4.2, the EMSRb heuristic
adjusts the booking limits such that the most of the passengers spilled are those
requesting lower fares.
Table 4.2 also shows that at higher demand factors, we can have a significant
spill. Among those spilled, there may be passengers who are willing to sell-up. Even at
low sell-up rates, the number of passengers willing to sell-up could be high if there is
considerable spill. This could have a significant impact on revenue. It would be
interesting to see the performance of the original EMSRb algorithm and its modifications
when we consider sell-up. In the next three cases, we consider sell-up under the same
scenario.
4.3.1.2 Case 1
Under this case, we assume that there exists moderate sell-up among passengers
of class 2 and 3. Specifically, we assume that the sell-up rate among passengers desiring
to travel in class 2 is 0.3 and that for class 3 is 0.2. This is in accordance with real life
scenarios. The sell-up rate among higher valued classes is usually more than that in
11 - mmIUii,
lower valued classes5 . Also, our intuition would agree with the fact that the class 2
passenger, who is not buying the deep discounted fare (class 3), is more likely to go for
the next higher fare as compared to the class 3 passenger who is shopping for the deep
discounted fare.
It must also be mentioned here that the sell-up rates are only applicable to
passengers who are spilled. Thus a sell-up rate of 0.3 would translate to the fact the 3 out
of every 10 passengers that are spilled, would go for the next higher fare. It is stressed
that the sell-up rate should not be tied with the individual demand for any class. It is the
spill that causes passengers to sell-up and spill is dependent upon the total demand,
booking limits and capacity, rather than the individual demand for any class.
Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 present the results under the three heuristic rules used to
control the booking limits. Note that under this case, we are assuming that the assumed
sell-up rate is equal to the actual sell-up rate. The validity of this statement is discussed
in Chapter 5.
5 Bohutinsky, Catherine H., "The Sell-up Potential ofAirline Demand", MS thesis, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology", May 1987.
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
0.8 79.96 39909 1 36.03 35.86 35.85 0.02 0
2 38.44 38.57 38.57 0 0
3 45.65 45.54 45.53 0.01 0
0.9 89.55 44733 1 40.54 40.38 40.31 0.17 0
2 43.24 43.11 42.98 0.25 0.09
3 51.35 51.7 51.05 0.65 0.12
1 96.1 48865 1 45.04 45.14 44.52 1.03 0
2 48.05 48.29 48.06 1.27 0.41
3 57.06 56.97 51.58 5.39 1.03
1.1 97.97 51817 1 49.54 49.51 48.39 1.97 0
2 52.86 52.91 53.31 3.03 0.84
3 62.77 63.15 45.26 17.89 3.43
1.2 98.74 55048 1 54.05 54.77 53.27 2.99 0
2 57.66 57.66 59.06 4.89 1.49
3 68.47 68.52 35.78 32.74 6.29
1.3 98.82 57713 1 58.55 58.55 57.23 3.36 0
2 62.47 62.65 64.81 7.03 2.04
3 74.18 73.7 26.19 47.51 9.19
1.4 98.89 60526 1 63.06 62.54 61.56 3.77 0
2 67.27 67.42 70.5 9.23 2.79
3 79.88 80.35 16.28 64.07 12.31
1.5 99.25 63608 1 67.56 67.89 66.52 4.88 0
2 72.08 72.3 75.63 11.79 3.51
3 85.59 85.25 6.72 78.53 15.13
Table 4.3: Scenario 1, Case 1, under original EMSRb
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
0.8 79.96 39913 1 36.03 35.86 35.86 0.01 0
2 38.44 38.57 38.58 0.01 0
3 45.65 45.54 45.5 0.04 0.01
0.9 89.33 44732 1 40.54 40.38 40.38 0.07 0
2 43.24 43.11 43.09 0.25 0.06
3 51.35 51.7 50.53 1.17 0.23
1 95.07 48948 1 45.04 45.14 44.99 0.51 0
2 48.05 48.29 48.74 1.12 0.36
3 57.06 56.97 48.88 8.09 1.56
1.1 96.65 52154 1 49.54 49.51 49.36 0.92 0
2 52.86 52.91 54.65 2.57 0.76
3 62.77 63.15 40.97 22.18 4.31
1.2 97.42 55624 1 54.05 54.77 54.64 1.36 0
2 57.66 57.66 60.77 4.32 1.23
3 68.47 68.52 30.72 37.8 7.42
1.3 97.47 58322 1 58.55 58.55 58.62 1.74 0
2 62.47 62.65 66.76 6.36 1.81
3 74.18 73.7 20.82 52.87 10.46
1.4 97.68 61234 1 63.06 62.54 62.78 2 0
2 67.27 67.42 73.37 7.77 2.23
3 79.88 80.35 10.38 69.97 13.72
1.5 98.1 64509 1 67.56 67.89 68.41 2.7 0
2 72.08 72.3 77.68 10.96 3.22
3 85.59 85.25 1.07 84.19 16.34
Table 4.4: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb2
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
0.8 79.96 39911 1 36.03 35.86 35.85 0.01 0
2 38.44 38.57 38.57 0 0
3 45.65 45.54 45.52 0.02 0.01
0.9 89.51 44730 1 40.54 40.38 40.31 0.15 0
2 43.24 43.11 43 0.25 0.08
3 51.35 51.7 50.94 0.76 0.14
1 95.81 48927 1 45.04 45.14 44.7 0.77 0
2 48.05 48.29 48.36 1.17 0.34
3 57.06 56.97 50.65 6.32 1.23
1.1 97.35 52083 1 49.54 49.51 48.89 1.3 0
2 52.86 52.91 54.54 2.31 0.67
3 62.77 63.15 42.61 20.55 3.94
1.2 98.06 55623 1 54.05 54.77 54.05 1.71 0
2 57.66 57.66 61.59 3.25 0.98
3 68.47 68.52 31.45 37.06 7.18
1.3 97.9 58432 1 58.55 58.55 57.97 1.86 0
2 62.47 62.65 68.8 4.45 1.28
3 74.18 73.7 20.08 53.62 10.6
1.4 97.65 61558 1 63.06 62.54 62.32 1.65 0
2 67.27 67.42 76.94 4.95 1.43
3 79.88 80.35 7.2 73.14 14.48
1.5 98.41 64550 1 67.56 67.89 68.13 2.79 0
2 72.08 72.3 78.31 10.25 3.04
3 85.59 85.25 1.18 84.08 16.26
Table 4.5: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb3
As seen from the above tables, there is a significant change in overall revenue as
compared to that when we did not consider sell-up. It would be interesting to compare
the difference in overall revenues, just by including the possibility of sell-up (both
assumed and actual). Figure 4.2 presents the change in overall revenues as compared to













Figure 4.2: Impact of sell-up on revenue, under Scenario 1.
As seen in Figure 4.2, just by including sell-up in our models, there is a
considerable change in overall revenues. Even at a demand factor of 1.0, the change in
overall revenue is around 0.5%. As the demand factor increases, the change in revenue
also increases. At demand factors above 1.4, the change could be as high as 3.5%. The
reason being that, under a given sell-up rate, the number of passengers willing to sell-up
.' r
increases with the increase in spill. It must be stressed that the percentage increase in
revenues in Figure 4.2 should not be taken as the ability of a heuristic to increase the
overall revenue. It only shows the difference in overall revenues when sell-up is
accounted for in the simulation. The comparison is made with the Base Case where there
was neither assumed nor actual sell-up. Even without any modification in the original
EMSRb algorithm, there is a significant increase in overall revenues under sell-up, as
there are passengers who will purchase a higher fare seat when a lower fare class is not
available.
It would be interesting to compare the performance of the modified heuristics,
EMSRb2 and EMSRb3, with that of the original EMSRb heuristic under equal values of
sell-up parameters. Figure 4.3 presents the difference in overall revenues under the two








Figure 4.3: Performance of modified rules
.--.---- EMSRb2
- EMSRb3
under Scenario 1, Case 1.
From Figure 4.3, we observe that both the modified EMSRb2 rule and the
proposed EMSRb3 heuristic can have a positive impact on the overall revenue when
compared to that under the original EMSRb algorithm. At low demand factors, below
1.0, there is no change in overall revenue. The reason is that there is not much spill and
hardly any sell-up. However, at high demand factors, around 1.4, the increase in overall
revenue can be as high as 1.5%. The reason for the differences in total revenues under
the three heuristics can be traced back to tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. Here we are reproducing
the results, for a demand factor of 1.2.












Figure 4.4: Loads, Spill and Sell-up for Scenario 1, Case 1 (DF=1.2).
Figure 4.4 presents the actual load, spill and sell-up, under the three rules, at
demand factor of 1.2. The loads under the modified rules have a greater proportion of
higher class passengers as compared to that under the original heuristic. Both the
modified rules are able to accommodate more of the higher class passengers. It is
interesting to see that the actual number of passengers selling up from class 2 to class 1 is
more under the original EMSRb heuristic. However, since the original EMSRb heuristic
does not protect any additional seats for passenger sell-up, many of the passengers sell-up
from class 2 to class 1 are simply replacing the original class 1 passengers. This is
evident from Figure 4.4, which shows that the original EMSRb heuristic results in
spilling more class 1 passengers as compared to that under the modified rules. Regarding
class 3, both sell-up and spill values are higher under the modified rules. Again, the
reason is that the modified rules protect additional seats for passengers that might sell-up.
This results in lower booking limits for class 3.
At a demand factor of 1.2, the overall revenue gains are similar under both the
modified rules, EMSRb2 and MESRb3 is similar. This is not true at all demand factors.
At a demand factor of 1.1, the EMSRb2 heuristic outperforms the EMSRb3 rule by a
small but significant (with 95% confidence) margin. On the other hand, the EMSRb3
performs considerably better than the EMSRb2 heuristic at demand factors of 1.3 and 1.4.
We are 99% confident that the improvements under the EMSRb3 heuristic are
significant. From Figure 4.3, it seems that EMSRb2 perform better at demand factors
below 1.2 and that EMSRb3 performs better at demand factors above 1.2. However, this
trend is not observed under all cases. EMSRb2 is very sensitive to sell-up rates. In the
very next case, when we increase the sell-up rates, the trend is almost opposite to that
seen in Case 1.
4.3.1.3 Case 2
Under this case, we assume that there exist higher sell-up rates among passengers
of class 2 and 3. Specifically, we assume that the sell-up rate among passengers desiring
to travel in class 2 is 0.4 and that for class 3 is 0.3. As before, the sell-up among class 2
passengers is more than that among those of class 3. Also, it is assumed that the sell-up
is existent only among the adjacent classes. Again, the sell-up rate is only applicable to
passengers that are spilled.
Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 present the results under the three heuristic rules used to
control the booking limits. As before, we are assuming that the sell-up rate assumed is
equal to the actual sell-up rate.
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
0.8 79.96 39909 1 36.03 35.86 35.85 0.02 0
2 38.44 38.57 38.57 0 0
3 45.65 45.54 45.53 0.01 0
0.9 89.57 44739 1 40.54 40.38 40.29 0.2 0
2 43.24 43.11 43.03 0.27 0.11
3 51.35 51.7 51.04 0.66 0.19
1 96.24 48935 1 45.04 45.14 44.49 1.26 0
2 48.05 48.29 48.41 1.49 0.61
3 57.06 56.97 51.46 5.51 1.6
1.1 98.34 52125 1 49.54 49.51 48.59 2.51 0
2 52.86 52.91 54.23 3.93 1.59
3 62.77 63.15 44.69 18.46 5.25
1.2 99.15 55395 1 54.05 54.77 53.48 3.99 0
2 57.66 57.66 60.14 6.96 2.7
3 68.47 68.52 35.1 33.41 9.43
1.3 99.22 58127 1 58.55 58.55 57.59 5.06 0
2 62.47 62.65 65.9 10.39 4.1
3 74.18 73.7 25.34 48.36 13.65
1.4 99.42 61042 1 63.06 62.54 62.06 5.92 0
2 67.27 67.42 71.64 13.94 5.44
3 79.88 80.35 15.43 64.91 18.16
1.5 99.61 64010 1 67.56 67.89 66.93 7.82 0
1 _ 1__ _ 1 2 72.08 72.3 76.52 17.63 6.86
1_ _ _ 1_ 3 85.59 85.25 5.97 79.28 21.86
Table 4.6: Scenario 1, Case 2, under original EMSRb
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
0.8 77.96 39666 1 36.03 35.86 35.86 0 0
2 38.44 38.57 39.93 0 0
3 45.65 45.54 41.16 4.38 1.35
0.9 86.76 44487 1 40.54 40.38 40.43 0.02 0
2 43.24 43.11 45.15 0.16 0.07
3 51.35 51.7 44.;5 7.14 2.2
1 92.12 48938 1 45.04 45.14 45.24 0.2 0
2 48.05 48.29 52.35 0.83 0.3
3 57.06 56.97 40.58 16.39 4.89
1.1 94.32 52622 1 49.54 49.51 49.84 0.56 0
2 52.86 52.91 59.8 2.33 0.89
3 62.77 63.15 31.85 31.31 9.22
1.2 95.97 56628 1 54.05 54.77 55.7 1.03 0
2 57.66 57.66 66.48 4.73 1.95
3 68.47 68.52 21.77 46.74 13.55
1.3 96.59 59677 1 58.55 58.55 59.89 1.51 0
2 62.47 62.65 73.28 7.43 2.85
3 74.18 73.7 11.72 61.98 18.06
1.4 97.28 62903 1 63.06 62.54 64.62 2.1 0
2 67.27 67.42 79.59 10.37 4.17
3 79.88 80.35 1.71 78.64 22.54
1.5 98.57 65720 1 67.56 67.89 71.22 4.26 0
2 72.08 72.3 76.64 19.03 7.59
3 85.59 85.25 0 85.25 23.37
Table 4.7: Scenario 1, Case 2, under EMSRb2
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
0.8 79.96 39910 1 36.03 35.86 35.85 0.01 0
2 38.44 38.57 38.58 0 0
3 45.65 45.54 45.52 0.02 0.01
0.9 89.54 44758 1 40.54 40.38 40.33 0.17 0
2 43.24 43.11 43.08 0.26 0.12
3 51.35 51.7 50.89 0.8 0.23
1 95.9 49058 1 45.04 45.14 44.75 0.97 0
2 48.05 48.29 48.96 1.34 0.58
3 57.06 56.97 50.14 6.84 2
1.1 97.54 52498 1 49.54 49.51 49.07 1.62 0
2 52.86 52.91 56.47 2.96 1.17
3 62.77 63.15 40.78 22.37 6.52
1.2 98.21 56323 1 54.05 54.77 54.4 2.17 0
2 57.66 57.66 64.98 4.32 1.8
3 68.47 68.52 27.94 40.58 11.63
1.3 98.12 59503 1 58.55 58.55 58.67 2.28 0
2 62.47 62.65 73.5 6.26 2.4
3 74.18 73.7 15.01 58.69 17.11
1.4 98.19 62779 1 63.06 62.54 63.28 2.6 0
2 67.27 67.42 81.41 8.43 3.33
3 79.88 80.35 2.6 77.74 22.42
1.5 99.07 65634 1 67.56 67.89 70.35 4.4 0
2 72.08 72.3 77.91 17.75 6.86
_ 3 85.59 85.25 0.34 84.91 23.36
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Figure 4.5: Performance of modified rules under Scenario 1, Case 2.
At increased sell-up rates and high demand factors, the relative performance of
the modified rules is further increased. At a demand factor of 1.2, the increase in overall
revenue under the modified rules, as compared to that under the original EMSRb
heuristic, is around 2%. The increase in revenue is primarily due to the fact that under
the proposed rule, the protection levels are adjusted to accommodate more of class 1 and
class 2 passengers. As explained in the previous case, there are passengers selling up
even under the original EMSRb heuristic. However, many of them are simply replacing
the original higher class passengers. The end result is that that more higher class
passengers are spilled under the original EMSRb heuristic as compared to that under the
two modified rules. Comparing the performance of the two modified rules, EMSRb2 and
EMSRb3, we observe that EMSRb2 performs even better than EMSRb3 at demand
factors above 1.0. However, at lower demand factors, below 1.0, there is a risk of
revenues getting than that under the original EMSRb algorithm.
It should be stressed that the above discussion is based upon the example used in
Scenario 1. The benefits of using theEMSRb2 or EMSRb3 rules may not exist in all
situations. In Scenario 2, we consider an example where the benefits of using the
modified EMSRb2 rule or the proposed EMSRb3 rule are not as considerable as under
Scenario 1.
4.3.2 Scenario 2
This is a seven-class example. Table 4.1 presents the mean demand and fare for
each class. These values are valid for all cases tested under Scenario 1.









Table 4.9: Scenario 2 parameters
The capacity of the aircraft is 238 seats. As under Scenario 1, there are 18
booking periods and the demand factors range from 0.8 to 1.5. We tested the above
scenario under the following cases:
Base Case: Sell-up does not exist. Both assumed as well as actual sell-up rates are given
as 0.
Case 1: Sell-up exists and the actual sell-up rate among passengers is equal to the
assumed sell-up rate.
As before, for each case, we simulated 500 iterations. The results presented here
are the mean values.
4.3.2.1 Base Case
As under Scenario 1, the Base Case does not consider sell-up. We neither assume
any sell-up rate, nor there exists any actual sell-up among the passengers. We use only
the original EMSRb algorithm. Recall that when there is no sell-up, both the modified
rules are reduced to the original EMSRb algorithm and we get the same protection levels
and the same results. The results can be observed from Table 4.10
Table 4.10: Scenario 2, Base Case
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
0.8 79.83 58308 1 36.03 35.73 35.73 0 0
2 9.58 9.56 9.56 0 0
3 18.39 18.22 18.22 0 0
4 12 11.96 11.96 0 0
5 38.44 38.66 38.66 0 0
6 45.65 45.7 45.7 0 0
7 30.37 30.15 30.15 0 0
0.9 89.82 65574 1 40.54 40.32 40.18 0.14 0
2 10.78 10.72 10.71 0.01 0
3 20.69 20.46 20.45 0.01 0
4 13.5 13.65 13.63 0.02 0
5 43.24 43.18 43.1 0.08 0
6 51.35 51.74 51.64 0.09 0
7 34.16 34.17 34.06 0.1 0
1 96.78 71261 1 45.04 45.05 44.27 0.79 0
2 11.98 11.9 11.79 0.11 0
3 22.99 22.98 22.85 0.13 0
4 15 15.11 14.89 0.22 0
5 48.05 47.58 46.61 0.97 0
6 57.06 57.45 56.16 1.28 0
7 37.96 37.79 33.78 4.01 0
1.1 98.33 74479 1 49.54 49.19 47.97 1.21 0
2 13.18 12.98 12.87 0.11 0
3 25.29 25.48 25.31 0.18 0
4 16.5 16.39 15.97 0.42 0
5 52.86 52.74 50.71 2.03 0
6 62.77 62.94 59.18 3.76 0
7 41.76 41.59 22.01 19.59 0
1.2 98.43 77248 1 54.05 53.74 52.34 1.4 0
2 14.38 13.96 13.82 0.14 0
3 27.59 27.58 27.31 0.27 0
4 18 17.94 17.44 0.49 0
5 57.66 57.58 55.04 2.54 0
6 68.47 68.37 62.53 5.84 0
7 45.55 45.46 5.79 39.67 0
1.3 98.9 79927 1 58.55 58.63 56.91 1.72 0
2 15.57 15.54 15.3 0.24 0
3 29.89 29.83 29.42 0.4 0
4 19.5 19.6 18.95 0.65 0
5 62.47 62.33 58.05 4.28 0
6 74.18 73.79 56.46 17.33 0
7 49.35 49.29 0.3 48.99 0
1.4 99.02 82106 1 63.06 62.99 60.96 2.03 0
2 16.77 17.04 16.83 0.2 0
3 32.19 32.54 32.01 0.53 0
4 21 20.97 19.98 0.99 0
5 67.27 66.56 60.92 5.64 0
6 79.88 79.02 44.81 34.21 0
7 53.14 53 0.16 52.84 0
1.5 98.97 84165 1 67.56 67.81 65.66 2.15 0
2 17.97 17.78 17.53 0.26 0
3 34.49 34.43 33.9 0.53 0
4 22.5 22.52 21.53 0.98 0
5 72.08 71.65 65.33 6.32 0
_ _6 85.59 85.75 31.48 54.27 0
7 56.94 56.79 0.11 56.68 0
From the above table we observe that, as the demand factor increases, the spill
also increases. However, as mentioned above, we have assumed that none of the
passengers are willing to sell-up. In the next case we shall incorporate sell-up and
compare the results.
4.3.2.2 Case 1
This is similar to the Case 1 under Scenario 1. We assume moderate sell-
up among all the classes. Table 4.10 shows the value of mean sell-up rate assumed for
each class.








Table 4.11: Mean sell-up rates for Case 1, Scenario 2.
It is assumed that the actual sell-up rate is equal to the assumed sell-up rate. As
mentioned earlier, this assumption may not be true in real life where we cannot have an
accurate estimate of the actual sell-up rate existing among passengers. Nevertheless, this
exercise gives us a fair idea of the impact of sell-up on overall revenues. Tables 4.11,
4.12 and 4.13 present the results under the three heuristic rules used to control the
booking limits.
Table 4.12: Scenario 2, Case 1, under original EMSRb
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
0.8 79.83 58308 1 36.03 35.73 35.73 0 0
2 9.58 9.56 9.56 0 0
3 18.39 18.22 18.22 0 0
4 12 11.96 11.96 0 0
5 38.44 38.66 38.66 0 0
6 45.65 45.7 45.7 0 0
7 30.37 30.15 30.15 0 0
0.9 89.82 65571 1 40.54 40.32 40.16 0.16 0
2 10.78 10.72 10.71 0.01 0
3 20.69 20.46 20.45 0.01 0
4 13.5 13.65 13.64 0.02 0
5 43.24 43.18 43.1 0.08 0.01
6 51.35 51.74 51.65 0.1 0.01
7 34.16 34.17 34.06 0.11 0.01
1 96.84 71274 1 45.04 45.05 44.19 0.9 0
2 11.98 11.9 11.77 0.15 0.04
3 22.99 22.98 22.84 0.17 0.02
4 15 15.11 14.95 0.27 0.03
5 48.05 47.58 46.63 1.14 0.1
6 57.06 57.45 56.45 1.49 0.19
7 37.96 37.79 33.66 4.13 0.49
1.1 98.51 74563 1 49.54 49.19 47.76 1.47 0
2 13.18 12.98 12.87 0.16 0.05
3 25.29 25.48 25.3 0.24 0.05
4 16.5 16.39 16.03 0.58 0.06
5 52.86 52.74 50.89 2.55 0.22
6 62.77 62.94 60.42 5.1 0.71
7 41.76 41.59 21.19 20.4 2.57
1.2 98.69 77378 1 54.05 53.74 52.05 1.76 0
2 14.38 13.96 13.81 0.23 0.07
3 27.59 27.58 27.26 0.4 0.07
4 18 17.94 17.52 0.76 0.08
5 57.66 57.58 55.24 3.52 0.35
6 68.47 68.37 65.07 8.75 1.19
7 45.55 45.46 3.92 41.55 5.46
1.3 99.13 79982 1 58.55 58.63 56.51 2.22 0
2 15.57 15.54 15.27 0.37 0.09
3 29.89 29.83 29.34 0.59 0.09
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Table 4.13: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb2
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
_____ (%) __ _ __ _ __ ___ _ __ _ _ _ _
0.8 79.83 58308 1 36.03 35.73 35.73 0 0
2 9.58 9.56 9.56 0 0
3 18.39 18.22 18.22 0 0
4 12 11.96 11.96 0 0
5 38.44 38.66 38.66 0 0
6 45.65 45.7 45.7 0 0
7 30.37 30.15 30.15 0 0
0.9 89.8 65571 1 40.54 40.32 40.2 0.13 0
2 10.78 10.72 10.71 0.01 0
3 20.69 20.46 20.44 0.02 0
4 13.5 13.65 13.63 0.02 0
5 43.24 43.18 43.09 0.1 0
6 51.35 51.74 51.67 0.1 0.01
7 34.16 34.17 33.99 0.18 0.03
1 96.6 71287 1 45.04 45.05 44.42 0.66 0
2 11.98 11.9 11.85 0.07 0.03
3 22.99 22.98 22.86 0.14 0.02
4 15 15.11 14.95 0.25 0.02
5 48.05 47.58 46.78 0.99 0.1
6 57.06 57.45 56.61 1.5 0.19
7 37.96 37.79 32.42 5.36 0.67
1.1 98.09 74560 1 49.54 49.19 48.17 1.05 0
2 13.18 12.98 12.88 0.15 0.04
3 25.29 25.48 25.28 0.24 0.05
4 16.5 16.39 16.19 0.45 0.04
5 52.86 52.74 51.11 2.33 0.25
6 62.77 62.94 60.69 5.14 0.7
7 41.76 41.59 19.13 22.46 2.89
1.2 98.33 77408 1 54.05 53.74 52.55 1.25 0
2 14.38 13.96 13.8 0.23 0.06
3 27.59 27.58 27.28 0.37 0.07
4 18 17.94 17.63 0.59 0.06
5 57.66 57.58 55.63 3.3 0.28
6 68.47 68.37 64.57 9.41 1.34
7 45.55 45.46 2.56 42.9 5.61
1.3 98.87 80047 1 58.55 58.63 56.96 1.74 0
2 15.57 15.54 15.38 0.26 0.07
102
3 29.89 29.83 29.37 0.57 0.1
4 19.5 19.6 19.28 0.88 0.12
5 62.47 62.33 60.03 5.76 0.55
6 74.18 73.79 54.16 24.6 3.46
7 49.35 49.29 0.14 49.16 4.97
1.4 98.97 82299 1 63.06 62.99 61.12 1.97 0
2 16.77 17.04 16.84 0.33 0.09
3 32.19 32.54 31.96 0.75 0.14
4 21 20.97 20.35 1.35 0.16
5 67.27 66.56 64.7 7.97 0.72
6 79.88 79.02 40.49 42.44 6.11
7 53.14 53 0.09 52.91 3.91
1.5 99.02 84403 1 67.56 67.81 65.64 2.28 0
2 17.97 17.78 17.43 0.47 0.1
3 34.49 34.43 33.9 0.72 0.12
4 22.5 22.52 21.99 1.56 0.18
1 1_ 5 72.08 71.65 70.38 10.15 1.03
6 85.59 85.75 26.26 62.5 8.87
7 56.94 56.79 0.06 56.73 3.01
Table 4.14: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb3
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
0.8 79.83 58308 1 36.03 35.73 35.73 0 0
2 9.58 9.56 9.56 0 0
3 18.39 18.22 18.22 0 0
4 12 11.96 11.96 0 0
5 38.44 38.66 38.66 0 0
6 45.65 45.7 45.7 0 0
7 30.37 30.15 30.15 0 0
0.9 89.82 65573 1 40.54 40.32 40.18 0.15 0
2 10.78 10.72 10.71 0.01 0
3 20.69 20.46 20.45 0.01 0
4 13.5 13.65 13.65 0.02 0
5 43.24 43.18 43.09 0.1 0.01
6 51.35 51.74 51.66 0.1 0
7 34.16 34.17 34.04 0.13 0.02
1 96.76 71289 1 45.04 45.05 44.3 0.78 0
2 11.98 11.9 11.79 0.13 0.03
3 22.99 22.98 22.85 0.14 0.02
4 15 15.11 14.99 0.25 0.02
5 48.05 47.58 46.62 1.14 0.13
6 57.06 57.45 56.46 1.53 0.18
7 37.96 37.79 33.27 4.52 0.55
1.1 98.29 74559 1 49.54 49.19 47.97 1.25 0
2 13.18 12.98 12.87 0.14 0.03
3 25.29 25.48 25.31 0.24 0.03
4 16.5 16.39 16.13 0.5 0.06
5 52.86 52.74 50.86 2.51 0.24
6 62.77 62.94 60.82 4.97 0.63
7 41.76 41.59 19.96 21.64 2.85
1.2 98.5 77417 1 54.05 53.74 52.34 1.46 0
2 14.38 13.96 13.81 0.21 0.05
3 27.59 27.58 27.28 0.37 0.07
4 18 17.94 17.63 0.64 0.07
5 57.66 57.58 55.37 3.46 0.33
6 68.47 68.37 65.11 8.86 1.24
7 45.55 45.46 2.89 42.57 5.6
1.3 98.97 80039 1 58.55 58.63 56.87 1.85 0
2 15.57 15.54 15.29 0.32 0.08
3 29.89 29.83 29.34 0.58 0.07
4 19.5 19.6 19.31 0.91 0.1
5 62.47 62.33 59.79 5.9 0.61
6 74.18 73.79 54.77 24.04 3.37
7 49.35 49.29 0.17 49.13 5.01
1.4 99.08 82328 1 63.06 62.99 60.94 2.14 0
2 16.77 17.04 16.87 0.32 0.09
3 32.19 32.54 31.94 0.73 0.14
4 21 20.97 20.4 1.26 0.12
5 67.27 66.56 65.06 7.53 0.69
6 79.88 79.02 40.49 42.64 6.03
7 53.14 53 0.12 52.88 4.1
1.5 99.07 84491 1 67.56 67.81 65.54 2.38 0
2 17.97 17.78 17.54 0.37 0.11
3 34.49 34.43 33.88 0.7 0.13
4 22.5 22.52 21.95 1.43 0.15
5 72.08 71.65 72.09 8.83 0.86
6 85.59 85.75 24.69 64.06 9.26
7 56.94 56.79 0.1 56.7 3
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It is very interesting to see the change in results with the increase in number of
classes and the number of seats. The first important observation is the decrease in impact
of sell-up on overall revenues. The reason is the relatively smaller difference in fares as
-compared to that in Scenario 1. Recall that in Scenario 1, for each fare class, the next
higher valued fare was twice the value. Thus for each passenger sell-up, the gain in
revenue was significant. Under Scenario 2, the increase in fare for adjacent classes varies
from as low as 8.7 % (class 2 to class 1) to a moderate 26.7% (class 4 to class 3). Figure
4.6 presents the impact of sell-up on overall revenue. Note that the comparison is made
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Figure 4.6: Impact of sell-up on revenue, under Scenario 2.
From Figure 4.6, we observe that as demand factor increases beyond 0.9, we
begin to see the impact of sell-up. However the increase in revenue is not considerable.
Even at a demand factor of 1.5, the difference is less than 0.4%. This is very small as
compared to that under Scenario 1. Recall that under Scenario 1, the corresponding value
was around 2%. The point here is that the impact of sell-up varies with the relative
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Figure 4.7: Performance of modified rules under Scenario 2, Case 1.
Figure 4.7 compares the overall revenues, under the two modified rules, with that
of the original EMSRb algorithm. As discussed earlier, sell-up does not have as big an
impact on revenues under Scenario 2. The benefit of using the modified rules, over the
original EMSRb heuristic is therefore smaller, compared to that under Scenario 1.
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Comparing the performance of the two modified rules, EMSRb2 and EMSRb3,
we observe that the overall revenue is similar under both the rules, if the demand factor is
less than 1.4. At very high demand factors, above 1.4, there is significant (with 95%
confidence interval) improvement in revenue, under EMSRb3.
The two scenarios give us a fair idea of the performance of the proposed EMSRb3
rule. We saw that the benefits of using the proposed EMSRb3 rule are not consistent
under all cases. We witnessed a considerable improvement in revenue under Scenario 1.
The improvement in Scenario 2 was smaller, compared to that under Scenario 1. The
reason can be linked with two important differences in the overall set up of the two
Scenarios: The relative difference in fares among adjacent classes and the total number of
classes. The revenue gains through sell-up are high under Scenario 1 when the difference
in fares among adjacent classes is high. Also, the percentage increase in revenue under
the proposed rule is more significant under Scenario 1 when we have fewer classes as
compared to that under Scenario 2. With the increase in number of classes, there is a
decrease in the number of people expected to sell-up to the next higher class. The reason
is lesser expected spill from each class. Note that this statement is based upon the
assumption that sell-up is only existent among adjacent classes. This might not be true in
the real world where passengers may sell-up to nonadjacent classes. Since the modified
rules assume sell-up among adjacent classes only, the protection levels under Scenario 2
are not much different than that under the original EMSRb heuristic. The result is
smaller revenue gains over the original heuristic.
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A desirable quality of the proposed rule is that for every additional seat protected,
it compares the expected gain with the expected loss. This ensures that there is not much
risk of losing any revenue when we move to the proposed EMSRb3 rule from the original
EMSRb heuristic. This is not the case for EMSRb2 rule. As observed under Scenario 1,
the overall revenue, under EMSRb2, could get lower then that under the original
heuristic. This is particularly true under high sell-up rates and low demand factors.
In this chapter, we presented a simulation to test the performance of the modified
EMSRb2 rule and the proposed EMSRb3 rule. The initial portion of the chapter
described the simulation structure, its environment and the assumptions associated with
it. In the remaining parts, we tested a number of cases under the original EMSRb
heuristic and the modified rules, EMSRb2 and EMSRb3. The results, under each rule
were discussed. We primarily concentrated on the performance of the modified rules
against that of the original EMSRb rule. We also compared the relative performance of
the two modified rules. In the next chapter, we perform sensitivity analysis and discuss





In the last chapter, we made two strong assumptions: The actual sell-up rate is
equal to the assumed sell-up rate, and the requests arrive as a Poisson process. The first
assumption implies that we have perfect knowledge of the sell-up rate existing among
passengers. The second assumption implies that the variance of the demand distribution
is equal to mean (characteristic of the Poisson distribution). In this chapter, we perform
sensitivity analysis to study the performance of the original EMSRb algorithm and the
modified rules, under situations which deviate from the above assumptions. We shall use
the same scenarios as developed in Chapter 4.
5.1 Sell-up Rate
As mentioned above, our analysis in the previous chapter was based upon the
assumption that we have perfect knowledge of the actual sell-up rate existing among the
spilled passengers. This is rarely the case. In reality is very difficult, if not impossible,
to accurately estimate the actual sell-up rate. To perform sensitivity analysis, we
intentionally introduce some error in the estimation of sell-up rate. This implies that, in
our simulation, the assumed sell-up rate would be different than the actual sell-up rate.
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Recall that the simulation uses the assumed sell-up rate to control the booking limits and
the actual sell-up rate to generate requests.
5.1.1 Scenario 1
This is the three class scenario developed in Chapter 4. For sensitivity analysis,
we introduce differences of 0.05, 0.1, 0.15 and 0.2 on both negative and positive side, in
the assumed vs. actual sell-up rate, and simulate Case I under the three heuristics. Recall
that under Case 1, the actual sell-up rate for class 2 and class 3 was 0.2 and 0.3
respectively. An error of 0.2 would translate to 100% and 67%, respectively, for the
assumed sell-up rates of class 3 and class 2. Detailed results for the simulation runs are
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Figure 5.1: Sensitivity of assumed sell-up rate under EMSRb2 (Scenario 1, Case 1).
Figure 5.1 compares the performance of the modified EMSRb2 rule with that of
the original EMSRb heuristic, under the various errors in sell-up rates. A '-' indicates
underestimation of actual sell-up rate. In the simulation it implies that the assumed sell-
up rate is less than the actual value. Similarly a '+' indicates over estimation, i.e. the
assumed sell-up rate is greater than the actual value. Note that we are only changing the
assumed sell-up rate in the simulation. The actual sell-up rate is not changed. This
implies that the results under the original EMSRb algorithm remain unchanged.
When sell-up rate is underestimated (assumed sell-up rate is less than the actual
sell-up rate), the benefits of using the modified EMSRb2 rule decrease. The greater the
error, the lesser is the improvement in revenue. The reason is that not enough seats are
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protected to capture sell-up. When sell-up rate is overestimated (assumed sell-up rate is
greater than the actual sell-up rate), the results are very sensitive to both the amount of
error and the demand factor. If the error is small (+0.05 in the current case), then it does
not have any negative impact. In fact, at high demand factor, a slight overestimation
(+0.5) can result in some improvements in revenue over the original EMSRb heuristic.
However, at high errors or low demand factors, or both, there can be a substantial
decrease in overall revenues. When the difference between the assumed sell-up rate and
actual sell-up rate is +0.15, the overall revenue gain over original EMSRb is very
sensitive to demand factors. It varies from -11.4% at demand factor of 0.8 to +1.6% at
demand factor of 1.5. At very higher errors (+0.2) there is a negative impact at all
demand factors and the overall revenue decreases by 9 to 12% at all demand factors (not
shown in Figure 5.1). This suggests that the sell-up rates assumed under the modified
EMSRb2 rule must be on the conservative side. An underestimation may cause a slight
decrease in revenue gains but an overestimation could result in substantial losses,
particularly at lower demand factors.
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Figure 5.2: Sensitivity of assumed sell-up rate under EMSRb3 (Scenario 1, Case 1).
Figure 5.2 compares the performance of the proposed EMSRb3 rule with that of
the original EMSRb heuristic, under the various errors in sell-up rates. Again a '-'
indicates under estimation, i.e. the assumed sell-up rate is less than the actual value and a
'+' indicates over estimation. As with EMSRb2, the benefits of using the modified rule
decrease when sell-up is underestimated. The reason is that the protection levels are not
enough to capture passengers willing to sell-up to high classes or the passengers selling
up are only replacing other higher class passengers. The greater the under estimation, the
lesser is the improvement in revenue over the original EMSRb algorithm.
An interesting phenomenon is observed under overestimation. The improvements
in overall revenues are further increased if the sell-up rate is overestimated at high
demand factors. The reason is that the additional seats protected are sold to higher class
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passengers if the demand factor is high. At lower demand there is no considerable impact
of overestimating the sell-up rate. This suggests that, under the proposed EMSRb3 rule,
there is not much risk of negative impacts on overall revenues, even under high errors on
sell-up estimation.
5.1.2 Scenario 2
This is similar to Case 1, under Scenario 2. We introduce some error in the
estimation of sell-up rates. As mentioned before, in reality it is not possible for an airline
to accurately measure the true sell-up rate existing among its customers. The result is
that the sell-up rate estimated or assumed by the airline is different from the actual sell-
up. Again, an error of 0.05, 0.1, 0.15 and 0.2 on both the negative and positive side, is
introduced in the actual sell-up rate. For the actual sell-up rates, among various classes
please refer to Table 4.11. The maximum error of 0.2 would thus translate to 67% for
class 2 and 100% for all the remaining classes. We expect that, in reality the sell-up rate
would be within these errors. Note that the sell-up rate cannot be less than zero. If after
deducting the error, the resulting value of assumed sell-up rate becomes less than zero,
we consider it as zero in our simulation. Figure 5.3 and 5.4 compare the performance of
the modified EMSRb2 rule and the proposed EMSRb3 rule with that of the original
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Figure 5.3: Sensitivity of assumed sell-up rate under EMSRb2 (Scenario 2, Case 1).
Figure 5.3 compares the performance of the modified EMSRb2 rule, with the
original EMSRb heuristic, under various errors in estimation of sell-up rate. As under
Scenario 1, a '-' indicates underestimation whereas a '+' indicates overestimation. When
the sell-up rate is underestimated, the benefits of the modified rule over the original
EMSRb algorithm are reduced. The greater the underestimation, the lesser is the
improvements. When the sell-up rate is overestimated, the improvements in overall
revenue are very sensitive to demand factors. At higher demand factors, there is a
positive impact on overall revenues and the improvements over the original EMSRb
algorithm are further enhanced. However, at lower demand factors, there is a risk of
negative impact on revenues. Again, this suggests under low or moderate demand
factors, the sell-up rates assumed under the modified EMSRb2 should be conservative.













Figure 5.4: Sensitivity of assumed sell-up rate under EMSRb3 (Scenario 2, Case 1).
Figure 5.4 compares the performance of the proposed EMSRb3 rule with that of
the original EMSRb heuristic, under various errors in sell-up rates. Again a '-' indicates
underestimation whereas a '+' indicates overestimation of actual sell-up rates. When the
sell-up rate is underestimated the trend is similar to that under the EMSRb2 rule. The
higher the error, the lesser are the benefits of the modified rule over the original EMSRb
algorithm. Again, there is not much risk of revenues getting below that under the original
heuristic, if the sell-up rates are underestimated.
When the sell-up rate is overestimated, the impact is dependent upon demand
factor. At low demand factors, the impact is not considerable. At high demand factors,
there is positive impact on overall revenues. The overestimation results in overprotection
of seats for higher class passengers. At high demand factors, this is desirable and
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enhances the improvements of the modified EMSRb3 rule. This suggests that it is more
desirable to have an overestimated sell-up rate as compared to an underestimated sell-up
rate when using the modified EMSRb3 rule.
5.2 Variability in Requests
In our previous analysis, we assumed that the requests arrive as a Poisson process
and the variance is equal to the mean forecasted demand. Recall the demand is
forecasted for each fare class, under each booking period. Since the demand is broken
into many booking periods, the variability could be high and our assumption, that
variance is equal to mean, may no longer be valid. To perform sensitivity analysis in this
area, we increase the variability in demands. Specifically we target for a Z-factor of 2.
Recall that the relationship between Z-factor, Standard Deviation (a) and mean demand
(p.) is as follows:
aT = Z* [
A Z-factor of 2 implies that the standard deviation is equal to twice the square
root of mean or the variance is four times the mean demand. This seems very large,
however, it is not unrealistic as the demand for each fare class is divided into 18 booking
periods and the number of requests for a specific fare class, under a specific booking
period, can be highly variable. We simulated both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, of Chapter
4, under high variability.
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To increase variability, we increase demands that are above mean and decrease
those that are below mean values. Note that these changes are made within the demands
generated for various iterations, for the same fare class and the same booking period.
The generated demands are adjusted such that the mean value of the demands generated
over iterations remains unchanged. Specifically, for every reduction of demand (for any
iteration that has demand below mean), there is a corresponding increase in demand
(under an iteration that has demand above mean).1
5.2.1 Scenario 1
This is the same three class scenario developed in Chapter 4. Here we shall
consider Case 1, under which there exists moderate sell-up. Recall that the sell-up rate
for class 2 and class 3 is 0.3 and 0.2, respectively. Under increased variability, the
performance of all the booking control algorithms suffers. Detailed results under the
three booking control rules, original EMSRb, EMSRb2 and EMSRb3 are included in
appendix. Here we shall focus on the changes in comparative performance of the two
modified rules under increased variability.
' The method is adopted from Bratu, Stephane, "Network Value Concept in Airline Revenue Management
MS thesis, MIT Flight Transportation Laboratory, May 1998.
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The performance of all the three heuristics is affected at increased variance.
However, the impact is not same under all rules. It would be interesting to compare the











Figure 5.5: Performance of modified rules under high variance (Scenario 1, Case 1).
The comparative performance of the modified rules has changed considerably
under increased variance. Under increased variance, EMSRb2 is very sensitive to
demand factor. At higher demand factors, above 1.2, there is a positive impact on overall
revenue, however, at low demand factors, there is a risk of negative impact. At a demand
factor of 0.9, the overall revenue could be 0.9% less than that under the original
algorithm. The reason is that the additional protection is not desirable under increased
120
variance. There is a risk that the demand would be much less than that expected and the
seats may remain unsold.
The benefits of EMSRb3, over the original EMSRb algorithm, are also reduced.
Again, the reason is the high variability in demand. The additional protection (for
passengers that might sell-up) is beneficial when the demand is equal to or higher than
that expected. At low demands, there is not much spill and not many passengers would
be willing to sell-up. However, unlike the case of EMSRb2, there is not much risk of
revenues getting lower than that under the original EMSRb algorithm.
5.2.2 Scenario 2
This is the 7 class scenario, developed in Chapter 4. For sell-up rates under
various fare classes, please refer to Table 4.9. We simulated this scenario under the
original EMSRb algorithm as well as the modified rules, EMSRb2 and EMSRb3.
Detailed results are included in appendix. Here we shall concentrate on the comparative
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Figure 5.6: Performance of modified rules under high variance (Scenario 2, Case 1).
Figure 5.6 shows the performance of the modified rules under high variance. The
performance of EMSRb3 as compared to that of the original EMSRb is not much
different than that under low variance. Recall the even under low variance, the
improvement in revenue under EMSRb3 was not considerable in Scenario 2. The high
variance does not make much difference. The performance of EMSRb2 is, however,
enhanced under increased variance. This is particularly observed at higher demand
factors. At a demand factor of 1.5, the improvement in revenue over the original EMSRb
algorithm, could be above 0.5%. Recall that under low variance, this figure was merely
0.1%
Comparing the relative performance of the two modified rules, we observe that
the modified rule EMSRb2 is very sensitive to the fare structure and variations in
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demand. In Scenario 2, we observed that the benefits of EMSRb2, over the original
algorithm are greater than that under lesser variance. However, in Scenario 1, the
improvements in revenue, over the original EMSRb algorithm, are highly sensitive to the
demand factor. At high demand factors (above 1.2), the revenue gains are similar to that
under lesser variance but at low demand factors, the overall revenue is less than that
under the original algorithm. The proposed EMSRb3 rule is more robust to variations in
demand. Although the improvements over the original algorithm are reduced under high
variance, however, there is not much risk of revenues going lower than that under the
original algorithm.
In this chapter we performed sensitivity analysis on the performance of the
modified rules. In the real world, neither the estimated sell-up rates are accurate, nor
does the demand follows a true Poisson distribution. We observed the effects of
misestimating the sell-up rates and high variability in demands. The focus was in the
changes in comparative performance of the two modified rules, against the original






In this thesis we were have emphasized the importance of passenger sell-up. It
was shown that passenger sell-up can account for considerable improvements in airline
revenues. The extent of improvement varies under the different types of booking control
algorithms. The parameters like sell-up rate, demand factor, spill, and fare ratios, also
effect the comparative performance of various booking control methods.
At low demand factors, there is not much spill. Most of the passengers are able to
obtain seats in their desired fare class and hardly any one is willing to sell-up. Under
these circumstances, no improvements in revenue are observed. However, at high
demand factors, there is considerable spill. Depending on the sell-up rate, there might be
a number of passengers willing to sell-up. This can result in huge revenue gains for
airlines. The higher the sell-up rates, the greater are the revenue gains.
Fare ratio also plays an important role in determining the revenue gains. If the
fare ratio is low, i.e., if the difference between adjacent fare classes is high, the additional
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revenue gained through sell-up is more. The lower the fare ratio, the more would be the
revenue gains.
We proposed a modified heuristic (referred as EMSRb3) to incorporate passenger
sell-up. Unlike most of the previous models, this heuristic also incorporates the lower
class demand in determining the protection levels for higher classes, given that sell-up is
expected. Specifically, it is an extension of the original EMSRb algorithm. The EMSRb
algorithm is first used to determine the protection levels. Based on these protection
levels, expected spill is computed for each fare class. Using the expected spill values
and the sell-up rates, the new heuristic estimates the expected number of passengers that
would be willing to sell-up. The booking limits are then readjusted based upon the
expected revenues from passengers willing to sell-up. The heuristic continues to protect
seats, in addition to the protection levels obtained from the original EMSRb algorithm, as
long as the expected revenue from passengers selling up is higher than the lower class
fare.
A simulation was developed to analyze the revenue performance of the proposed
rule and that of the existing rules. We focussed on the relative performance of the two
modified rules, the one developed by Belobaba and Weatherford' (referred as EMSRb2),
and the proposed EMSRb3 rule, against that of the original EMSRb algorithm. The
proposed rule results in revenue gains over the original EMSRb algorithm. However, it is
' Peter P. Belobaba & Lawrence R. Weatherford, "Comparing Decision Rules that Incorporate Customer
Diversion in Perishable Asset Revenue Management Situations", Decision Sciences, Volume 27, Spring
1996.
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stressed that the revenue gains vary under different scenarios. In our test cases, the
proposed rule showed considerable improvements under Scenario 1. But in Scenario 2,
the gains were minimal. Scenario 1 is characterized by few fare classes and low fare
ratios. Scenario 2, on the other hand, is characterized by many fare classes and higher
fare ratios. Nevertheless, the proposed rule never resulted in losses in overall revenues
when compared to that under the original algorithm. This was not the case with
EMSRb2. Under low demand factors, it can result in revenues lower than that under the
original algorithm.
Our analysis recognizes the fact that the sell-up rates assumed by an airline are
not likely to be accurate. The simulation, we developed, has the provision of specifying
two different values of sell-up rates: assumed sell-up rate and actual sell-up rate. The
assumed sell-up rate is used for computing the protection levels whereas the actual sell-
up rate is used for deciding if a simulated passenger would actually sell-up to the next
higher class. We also analyzed the performance of the two modified rules under
situations when the assumed sell-up rate is not equal to the actual value (i.e., under errors
in sell-up estimation). It was shown that the proposed EMSRb3 rule is more robust to
errors in sell-up estimation than the EMSRb2 rule. There may be situations under which
EMSRb2 outperforms the proposed rule, however, it is more sensitive to errors in sell-up
estimation. This is particularly true for overestimated sell-up rates, i.e., when the
assumed sell-up rates are greater then the actual sell-up rates. If the sell-up rates are
seriously overestimated, then there are risks of extreme negative impacts on overall
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revenue, under the EMSRb2 heuristic. On the contrary, the proposed EMSRb3 rule is not
adversely affected by overestimation of sell-up rates.
With under estimated sell-up rates, the improvements in revenue, under both the
modified rules, EMSRb2 and EMSRb3, are reduced. The more the underestimation, the
lesser are the improvements in revenue. The reason is that with underestimated sell-up
rates, the modified rules have protection levels that are close to the original algorithm and
the resulting performance is close to that under the original algorithm.
We also analyzed the performance of the two modified rules under increased
variability in demands. Again it was shown that the proposed EMSRb3 rule is more
robust. Although the improvements in revenue, as compared to the original EMSRb
algorithm, were reduced under higher variability, the decrease in revenue was consistent
under both the scenarios. Most importantly, there was not much risk of losing revenue
against the original EMSRb algorithm. The performance of EMSRb2 rule, under
increased variability was not consistent over the two scenarios tested. In the first
scenario, under low demand factors, it resulted in revenue losses over the original
EMSRb algorithm. Surprisingly, in the second scenario, under high demand factors, the
performance of the EMSRb2 rule was further enhanced and the revenue gains were even
greater than that under lesser variability.
Based on our analysis we cannot guarantee which of the two modified rules will
outperform the other one in the real world. However, do we believe that the proposed
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EMSRb3 rule is more robust to uncertainties in demands and sell-up rates and is less
likely to cause a negative impact on overall revenues.
6.2 Future Research Directions
We believe that there is a lot of room for further research in the area of
passenger sell-up. Some of the research directions are mentioned below:
* Sell-up among non-adjacentfare classes: Throughout our analysis, we assumed that
sell-up is only existent among adjacent fare classes. This might not be true under
large number of fare classes. When the fare ratio is high, i.e. the difference between
fares is less, sell-up would also exist among non-adjacent fare classes. It would be
interesting to incorporate this fact into the decision rule.
e Combination of EMSRb2 and EMSRb3: EMSRb2 uses decision tree concept to
incorporate passenger sell-up in the original heuristic. On the other hand, EMSRb3
uses expected spill and expected sell-up to readjust the protection levels obtained
from the original algorithm. It might be beneficial to combine both these modified
rules.
* Estimation of Sell-up rates: Not much work had been done to estimate passenger sell-
up. Estimation of sell-up rate is the prerequisite for implementing any rule that
incorporates passenger sell-up in airline revenue management.
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* Competitive Environment: Our analysis is based upon the simplified assumption that
there exists only one airline in the market. It would be beneficial to analyze the
performance of the proposed rule under a competitive environment with more than
one airline.
* Network Effects: Our analysis is based upon a single leg case. It would be interesting
to study the impact of passenger sell-up on the whole network.
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Appendix
Al: Sensitivity of sell-up rate
Table A1.1: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb2, with -0.05 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7996 39911 1 3603 3586 3585 001 0
2 3844 3857 3858 001 0
3 4565 4554 4551 003 001
09 89.43 44734 1 4054 4038 4036 011 0
2 43.24 43 11 4301 026 009
3 5135 51.7 5078 092 016
1 9551 48968 1 4504 4514 4494 062 0
2 4805 48.29 4836 128 042
3 5706 5697 4996 701 134
1.1 97.08 52088 1 4954 4951 49 16 1 15 0
2 5286 5291 5416 278 08
3 6277 63 15 423 20.85 404
12 97.95 55563 1 5405 5477 5457 166 0
2 5766 5766 5978 478 146
3 6847 6852 3257 3595 69
13 979 58184 1 5855 5855 5838 215 0
2 6247 6265 659 664 198
3 7418 737 2256 5113 989
14 9805 61035 1 6306 62.54 6257 248 0
2 6727 6742 7214 853 251
3 7988 8035 1237 6798 1325
15 985 64333 1 6756 6789 6793 327 0
2 72.08 723 7734 1095 331
3 8559 8525 248 8277 16
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Table A1.2: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb2, with -0.10 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill PaL
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7996 39911 1 3603 3586 35 85 0.01 0
2 3844 3857 38 57 001 0
3 4565 4554 4552 002 001
09 8948 44734 1 4054 4038 4034 0.13 0
2 4324 43 11 4297 027 009
3 5135 517 5091 079 014
1 95 74 48938 1 4504 45.14 448 0.73 0
2 4805 4829 48.24 127 039
3 57.06 5697 5056 641 121
11 9748 52029 1 4954 4951 49.01 141 0
2 5286 5291 5361 303 091
3 6277 6315 436 1955 373
12 98.26 55434 1 5405 5477 5431 198 0
2 5766 5766 5925 509 151
3 6847 6852 3384 3468 667
13 9832 58056 1 58 55 58.55 5803 251 0
2 6247 6265 6548 685 199
3 74 18 73 7 2397 49 73 969
14 9848 60898 1 6306 6254 6243 285 0
2 6727 67.42 70.97 92 274
3 79 88 8035 1433 6602 1274
15 98 71 64152 1 6756 6789 6781 3 61 0
2 7208 723 7618 1178 353
3 8559 8525 408 8117 1566
Table A1.3: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb2, with -0.15 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (/) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7996 39911 1 3603 3586 35 85 001 0
2 38 44 38.57 3857 001 0
3 4565 4554 4552 002 001
09 89.51 44729 1 4054 4038 4032 0.15 0
2 43 24 4311 4298 027 008
3 51 35 51 7 5096 0.74 014
1 9593 48900 1 4504 45 14 4466 084 0
2 4805 4829 48 12 133 036
3 5706 5697 5111 586 115
11 97.77 51964 1 49 54 49 51 488 159 0
2 5286 5291 5336 314 088
3 6277 63 15 4449 1867 359
12 9845 55294 1 5405 5477 5408 227 0
2 5766 5766 5873 54 157
3 6847 6852 3486 3365 647
13 985 57859 1 5855 5855 578 2.91 0
2 6247 6265 6457 742 217
3 74 18 73 7 2538 4832 934
14 9857 60688 1 63 06 6254 6206 3.22 0
2 6727 6742 7055 9.48 274
3 7988 8035 1524 65 11 1261
15 9898 63878 1 67.56 6789 67.33 423 0
2 7208 72.3 7538 12.22 368
3 8559 8525 5 75 79 5 153
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Table A1.4: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb2, with -0.20 sell-up error
Demand Ioad Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7996 39909 1 3603 35.86 35.85 0.02 0
2 3844 3857 3857 0 0
3 4565 4554 4553 001 0
09 8955 44736 1 4054 4038 40.32 016 0
2 4324 43.11 4297 027 009
3 5135 517 5104 066 013
1 9604 48881 1 4504 4514 44.65 093 0
2 4805 48.29 47.87 145 044
3 5706 5697 51.55 542 103
11 9797 51891 1 4954 4951 4863 185 0
2 5286 5291 531 316 097
3 6277 63 15 4522 1793 336
12 9869 55167 1 5405 5477 5379 266 0
2 5766 5766 5837 555 168
3 6847 6852 35.88 3263 6.26
13 9876 57824 1 5855 5855 57.73 311 0
2 6247 6265 64.16 757 23
3 7418 737 26.24 4745 908
14 9886 60595 1 6306 6254 61 82 358 0
2 6727 67 42 7022 96 286
3 7988 80.35 16.26 6409 124
15 9909 63680 1 67.56 6789 67.03 456 0
2 7208 723 74.82 1253 37
3 8559 8525 68 7846 1505
Table A1.5: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb2 with +0.05 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7995 39911 1 3603 3586 35.85 001 0
2 38.44 3857 3859 0 0
3 4565 4554 4549 0.05 002
09 89 13 44724 1 4054 4038 4041 004 0
2 4324 4311 43.23 0.2 007
3 51 35 51 7 50.05 1.65 0.33
1 9435 48915 1 45 04 45 14 45.08 0.35 0
2 4805 4829 49.33 091 029
3 5706 5697 47.11 986 194
11 9566 52135 1 4954 4951 4948 0.68 0
2 5286 5291 55.64 21 064
3 6277 63 15 38.38 24.77 484
12 9656 55717 1 5405 5477 54.94 093 0
2 5766 5766 618 375 109
3 6847 6852 281 4041 789
13 9672 58486 1 5855 5855 5877 132 0
2 6247 6265 68.52 5 12 153
3 74 18 73.7 1779 55 9 1099
1.4 9692 61361 1 6306 6254 63.06 1.52 0
2 6727 6742 7453 706 203
3 79.88 8035 7.8 7255 1417
1 5 97 68 64520 1 67 56 67 89 68.76 2.47 0
2 7208 72.3 7733 1135 334
3 8559 8525 0.43 8483 1639
Table A1.6: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb2, with +0.10 sell-up error
Demand Ioad Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (/) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7764 39521 1 36.03 3586 35 86 0 0
2 3844 3857 3944 0 0
3 45 65 45 54 41.16 438 087
09 8628 44257 1 40.54 40.38 4042 0 0
2 4324 4311 4438 014 004
3 5135 51 7 4462 707 1.41
1 91 22 48486 1 4504 45 14 45.16 014 0
2 4805 4829 5094 049 016
3 57.06 5697 40 73 1624 314
11 9307 51926 1 4954 4951 4961 0.3 0
2 52.86 52 91 5773 131 04
3 6277 63.15 3227 3089 613
1 2 9432 55643 1 5405 5477 5507 0.46 0
2 5766 5766 6425 257 075
3 6847 6852 22 15 4636 916
13 9474 58491 1 58.55 5855 5898 077 0
2 6247 6265 7089 3.9 12
3 74 18 73 7 1223 6146 1214
1.4 9525 61499 1 63 06 6254 63 19 0.88 0
2 6727 6742 77.54 532 1 53
3 7988 80.35 215 78 19 1544
15 9732 64626 1 6756 6789 69 46 205 0
2 7208 72 3 7648 122 362
3 8559 8525 004 8521 1638
Table A1.7: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb2, with +0.15 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (/) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 557 35824 1 3603 35 86 35.86 0 0
2 38.44 38.57 47.69 0 0
3 4565 4554 0 4554 912
0.9 6255 40261 1 4054 4038 40.38 0 0
2 43.24 4311 53.44 0 0
3 5135 51.7 0 517 1033
1 6991 45001 1 4504 45 14 45 14 0 0
2 48.05 4829 59 72 0 0
3 5706 5697 0 5697 1143
11 76 75 49393 1 49 54 4951 4951 0 0
2 5286 5291 6561 0 0
3 6277 63.15 0 63 15 12 71
12 8402 54254 1 5405 5477 5481 0 0
2 5766 5766 71.22 015 004
3 6847 6852 0 6852 137
13 8981 58073 1 58 55 5855 5886 0.13 0
2 6247 62.65 7585 1.53 044
3 7418 737 0 73 7 1473
14 94 12 61471 1 6306 62 54 6373 0.58 0
2 67.27 6742 7745 5.8 177
3 7988 8035 0 8035 1583
15 9666 64641 1 6756 6789 7049 1.64 0
2 7208 723 745 13.99 424
3 8559 8525 0 8525 1619
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Table A1.8: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb2, with +0.20 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 54 56 35441 1 3603 3586 3629 0 0
2 38 44 3857 45.55 148 043
3 4565 4554 0 45.54 846
09 62 51 40253 1 4054 40 38 4041 0 0
2 43 24 43 11 53.35 008 003
3 5135 51.7 0 51.7 1033
1 695 44903 1 4504 45 14 45.42 0 0
2 4805 4829 58.83 0.9 028
3 5706 5697 0 5697 1144
11 7333 48466 1 49 54 4951 51.56 0 0
2 52 86 5291 58.44 6.65 204
3 6277 63 15 0 63 15 12 18
12 7439 51562 1 5405 5477 60.29 0 0
5766 5766 51.3 18.27 5.51
3 6847 68 52 0 68.52 11 91
13 7387 53486 1 5855 5855 6748 0 0
2 6247 6265 4333 3007 893
3 7418 73.7 0 73.7 10 76
14 7282 55297 1 6306 6254 7509 0 0
2 6727 67.42 3415 41 94 1254
3 7988 8035 0 8035 867
15 726 57936 1 6756 67.89 84.22 0 0
2 7208 723 24.68 543 1633
3 8559 8525 0 8525 668
Table A1.9: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb3, with -0.05 sell-up error
Demand- Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7996 39911 1 3603 3586 35 85 001 0
2 3844 38 57 3857 0 0
3 4565 45 54 45 52 002 001
09 8951 44734 1 4054 4038 4032 015 0
2 43.24 43.11 42.99 025 009
3 51.35 51 7 50.95 075 014
1 9586 48923 1 45.04 45 14 4469 081 0
2 4805 4829 4831 118 035
3 57.06 5697 5079 619 12
11 9749 52075 1 49 54 49.51 4892 138 0
2 5286 52.91 54.17 252 0.78
3 62.77 63.15 43.15 20 379
12 98 19 55567 1 54.05 5477 54.06 1 83 0
2 5766 5766 6099 374 1 11
3 68.47 68 52 32.24 3628 707
13 9801 58301 1 5855 5855 5799 2.07 0
2 62.47 6265 67.68 528 1.51
3 7418 73 7 21.34 5236 1032
1 4 97.91 61405 1 63.06 62.54 62.33 1.99 0
2 6727 6742 75.52 595 178
3 7988 8035 9.01 71 34 1405
1 5 98.49 64493 1 67.56 67 89 67.9 294 0
2 72.08 723 78.5 10.13 295
3 85.59 85 25 1.33 83.92 16 33
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Table A .10: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb3, with -0.10 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7996 39911 1 3603 3586 3585 001 0
2 3844 38 57 3857 0 0
3 4565 4554 4552 002 001
09 8951 44732 1 4054 4038 4032 015 0
2 4324 43 11 43 025 009
3 5135 517 5096 074 014
1 959 48909 1 4504 45.14 44 67 086 0
2 4805 4829 482 124 038
3 5706 5697 5099 599 115
1 1 9759 52031 1 4954 4951 4885 15 0
2 5286 5291 5394 27 083
3 6277 6315 4359 1957 374
12 9833 55455 1 5405 5477 5397 204 0
2 5766 57.66 6028 4.23 124
3 6847 6852 33.24 3528 684
1 3 9827 58251 1 5855 5855 5807 2.27 0
2 6247 6265 6672 587 179
3 7418 737 22.62 51 08 995
14 98 17 61200 1 6306 62.54 623 234 0
2 6727 67.42 73 85 7.1 21
3 7988 8035 11 1 6925 1353
1.5 9859 64442 1 6756 6789 677 309 0
2 7208 723 7863 995 29
3 8559 8525 155 837 1628
Table A1.11: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb3, with -0.15 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7996 39911 1 3603 3586 3585 001 0
2 3844 38.57 38.57 0 0
3 4565 4554 45 52 002 001
09 8951 44730 1 40.54 4038 4031 016 0
2 43.24 43 11 42.99 026 009
3 51.35 51 7 5097 073 014
1 9593 48905 1 4504 45 14 4467 086 0
2 4805 4829 48 14 128 039
3 5706 5697 5108 589 113
1.1 977 51980 1 4954 4951 48 78 157 0
2 52 86 5291 5363 2.96 084
3 6277 63 15 4413 1902 368
12 9848 55356 1 5405 5477 53 9 226 0
2 5766 5766 5961 471 139
3 6847 6852 3421 34 3 666
13 98 43 58074 1 58.55 58 55 57.98 257 0
2 6247 6265 6558 669 2
3 7418 737 2408 4961 963
14 9839 60982 1 6306 6254 6233 269 0
2 6727 6742 7196 852 248
3 7988 80.35 133 6705 1306
15 9867 64288 1 6756 6789 67.58 344 0
2 7208 723 7785 1044 313
3 8559 8525 257 8269 16
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Table A1. 12: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb3, with -0.20 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 79.96 39909 1 3603 35.86 35 85 002 0
2 3844 3857 3857 0 0
3 4565 4554 4553 001 0
09 8955 44736 1 4054 4038 4032 016 0
2 4324 43 11 42.96 027 01
3 5135 517 5105 065 012
1 9605 48882 1 4504 4514 4463 094 0
2 4805 4829 4791 143 043
3 5706 5697 5154 5.43 105
1 1 979 51908 1 4954 4951 48.75 1.74 0
2 5286 5291 5294 337 098
3 6277 63 15 45 17 17.99 34
12 9868 55172 1 5405 5477 5381 2.69 0
2 5766 5766 5835 549 173
3 6847 6852 3586 3266 617
13 987 57851 1 5855 5855 5795 297 0
2 6247 6265 6378 793 236
3 7418 737 2633 4737 906
14 9876 60706 1 6306 6254 62.39 328 0
2 6727 6742 69.38 10.3 3 13
3 7988 8035 16.36 6398 1227
15 9903 63814 1 6756 67.89 67.6 423 0
2 7208 723 741 1317 3.94
3 8559 8525 685 7841 1497
Table A113: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb3, with +0.05 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7996 39911 1 3603 3586 3585 001 0
2 3844 3857 3857 0 0
3 45.65 4554 4552 002 001
09 8951 44735 1 4054 4038 40.32 014 0
2 4324 4311 43 025 008
3 5135 51.7 5094 0.76 014
1 9578 48934 1 4504 45.14 4472 0.74 0
2 4805 4829 4839 116 032
3 5706 5697 5056 641 125
11 9731 52128 1 4954 4951 4894 131 0
2 52 86 5291 54.74 215 074
3 6277 6315 4229 20.86 398
12 9789 55677 1 5405 5477 54.07 158 0
2 5766 57.66 6213 294 088
3 6847 6852 30 64 3787 741
13 9771 58498 1 5855 5855 5798 171 0
2 6247 62.65 6949 398 1.14
3 7418 73 7 19.09 54.6 1082
14 97.49 61620 1 6306 6254 623 1.54 0
2 6727 6742 7765 44 13
3 79 88 8035 6.28 7407 1463
1.5 9837 64585 1 6756 6789 68.3 272 0
2 7208 723 78.12 1041 3.13
3 8559 8525 115 8411 1623
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Table A1.14: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb3, with +0.10 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7996 39911 1 3603 35 86 3585 001 0
2 3844 3857 3857 0 0
3 4565 4554 4552 0.02 001
09 8951 44741 1 4054 4038 4032 013 0
2 4324 43 11 4303 023 007
3 5135 517 5091 079 015
1 9574 48936 1 45.04 45.14 4473 074 0
2 48.05 4829 4845 1.09 033
3 5706 5697 5042 655 125
11 9717 52146 1 4954 4951 4897 119 0
2 5286 5291 5498 203 065
3 6277 6315 4182 2133 41
1 2 9776 55735 1 5405 5477 541 14 0
2 5766 5766 6263 264 072
3 6847 6852 2992 3859 761
13 9757 58593 1 5855 5855 5807 1 54 0
2 6247 6265 7005 356 106
3 7418 737 1822 5547 1096
14 9739 61627 1 6306 6254 6231 148 0
2 6727 6742 7782 436 125
3 7988 8035 596 7439 1477
1 5 9835 64601 1 6756 6789 6838 276 0
2 7208 723 7802 105 325
3 8559 8525 113 8413 1622
Table A1.15: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb3, with +0. 5 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7996 39911 1 3603 3586 3585 001 0
2 38.44 3857 3857 0 0
3 45.65 4554 4552 002 001
09 8949 44738 1 40.54 40.38 40.33 014 0
2 4324 4311 4302 023 009
3 5135 517 5088 082 015
1 957 48938 1 4504 4514 4475 075 0
2 4805 48.29 4846 1 11 036
3 5706 5697 5035 663 127
1 1 971 52163 1 4954 4951 4896 1 11 0
2 5286 5291 5522 188 056
3 6277 63 15 4147 21.68 419
12 9765 55776 1 5405 54.77 54.16 132 0
2 5766 5766 6288 252 071
3 6847 6852 29.44 3907 773
13 9739 58633 1 5855 5855 58.05 1.45 0
2 6247 6265 7065 32 0.95
3 7418 737 1738 56.31 112
14 9733 61628 1 6306 6254 62.26 1.5 0
2 6727 6742 7807 414 1.22
3 7988 8035 565 7469 1479
1 5 9831 64674 1 6756 6789 6862 252 0
2 7208 723 7783 1063 325
3 8559 8525 101 8425 1616
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Table A1.16: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb3, with +0.20 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) _ _ Sell-up
0.8 7996 39911 1 3603 3586 3585 001 0
2 3844 3857 38.57 0 0
3 45.65 4554 4552 0.02 001
09 8949 44740 1 4054 4038 4033 013 0
2 4324 43 11 4303 023 008
3 5135 517 5087 083 015
1 9568 48945 1 4504 45.14 4475 073 0
2 4805 4829 4854 107 034
3 5706 5697 5024 673 131
1 1 97 52175 1 4954 4951 4897 1.06 0
2 5286 5291 55.43 177 051
3 6277 6315 411 2205 43
1 2 9746 55782 1 5405 5477 54.14 129 0
2 5766 5766 6325 2.25 066
3 6847 6852 28.8 39.72 7.83
1 3 9726 58666 1 58.55 5855 5801 138 0
2 6247 6265 7118 28 084
3 7418 737 1669 57 1133
14 9724 61688 1 6306 62.54 6241 136 0
2 6727 67.42 78 17 412 122
3 7988 8035 527 7508 1488
1 5 9826 64672 1 67.56 67.89 6866 245 0
2 7208 723 7778 1071 322
3 8559 8525 096 84.3 162
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Table A1.17: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb2, with -0.05 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 79 83 58308 1 3603 35 73 3573 0 0
2 9.58 956 9 56 0 0
3 1839 1822 1822 0 0
4 12 1196 1196 0 0
5 3844 3866 3866 0 0
6 4565 45.7 45.7 0 0
7 3037 3015 3015 0 0
09 8981 65570 1 40.54 4032 4018 014 0
2 1078 1072 10 7 002 0
3 2069 2046 2044 002 0
4 135 1365 1363 003 0
5 43 24 43 18 43 11 008 001
6 5135 5174 5165 01 001
7 3416 3417 3402 014 002
1 9669 71292 1 4504 45 05 4436 071 0
2 11.98 119 1183 009 002
3 22 99 22.98 2286 015 002
4 15 1511 1495 0.27 003
5 4805 4758 4663 113 01
6 5706 5745 5656 149 018
7 3796 3779 3293 486 061
1 1 9826 74565 1 49 54 49 19 48.08 1 14 0
2 1318 1298 1287 017 004
3 2529 2548 25.25 03 006
4 165 16.39 1614 049 006
5 52 86 52.74 50 89 2.52 0.24
6 6277 6294 6059 5.13 067
7 41 76 41 59 20.04 21 55 278
1 2 98 51 77409 1 5405 5374 5233 149 0
2 1438 1396 1374 027 008
3 2759 2758 2733 033 005
4 18 1794 1753 073 008
5 5766 5758 5556 325 032
6 6847 6837 6499 895 1 23
7 4555 4546 295 4251 5 58
13 9895 80025 1 5855 5863 5683 1 88 0
2 1557 1554 1533 028 007
3 29 89 29.83 2942 051 007
4 195 196 1923 097 011
5 6247 6233 596 617 059
6 74 18 73 79 5494 2381 344
7 4935 4929 0.14 49 15 495
14 99 1 82276 1 6306 6299 609 224 0
2 1677 1704 16 71 047 015
3 3219 3254 3201 068 014
4 21 2097 2041 138 015
5 6727 6656 6433 8 17 082
6 7988 7902 41.4 4151 594
7 53 14 53 01 52.9 3 89
15 99 14 84392 1 67.56 6781 6548 248 0
2 1797 17.78 1736 055 015
3 3449 3443 3383 077 013
4 225 22.52 21 93 1.6 017
5 7208 71.65 7035 1012 101
6 8559 85 75 2695 61 81 882
7 5694 56 79 006 56.74 302
Table A1.18: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb2, with -0.10 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill PaxL
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7983 58308 1 3603 3573 35.73 0 0
2 958 956 9.56 0 0
3 1839 18.22 1822 0 0
4 12 1196 11.96 0 0
5 3844 3866 3866 0 0
6 4565 457 45.7 0 0
7 3037 3015 3015 0 0
09 8982 65571 1 4054 4032 4017 015 0
2 1078 1072 1071 001 0
3 2069 2046 2044 002 0
4 13.5 1365 1363 0.03 0
5 4324 43 18 43.1 008 001
6 5135 51 74 5166 0.09 001
7 3416 3417 3404 013 002
1 96.79 71289 1 4504 4505 4426 083 0
2 1198 11 9 11.81 012 004
3 2299 2298 22.86 0.16 003
4 15 15 11 1492 0.29 004
5 4805 4758 46 66 1 1 009
6 5706 5745 5649 15 018
7 3796 3779 3336 443 054
1 1 9838 74568 1 4954 4919 4796 1.28 0
2 13 18 1298 12.83 019 005
3 25.29 25 48 25.3 023 0.03
4 165 16.39 16.18 0.46 005
5 52.86 52.74 5089 258 0.26
6 6277 6294 6028 532 074
7 41.76 41 59 2069 2091 266
12 9858 77375 1 5405 5374 5216 165 0
2 1438 13.96 1379 023 007
3 2759 2758 27.31 037 0.06
4 18 1794 17.49 077 0.1
5 5766 57.58 5541 346 033
6 6847 68.37 64.93 887 129
7 45.55 4546 354 41.92 544
1 3 99 05 80006 1 58.55 58 63 5667 2.07 0
2 15.57 1554 1527 036 01
3 2989 29.83 2942 056 009
4 19.5 196 1895 117 015
5 6247 62.33 59.87 58 0.51
6 74.18 7379 5539 2341 334
7 49.35 49.29 0.16 4914 5.01
14 9917 82244 1 6306 6299 6085 228 0
2 16.77 1704 16.68 047 013
3 3219 3254 31.95 074 012
4 21 20.97 20.2 1.5 014
5 67.27 6656 6388 838 073
6 7988 79.02 4236 40.83 5.7
7 53.14 53 011 5289 417
1.5 9922 84358 1 67.56 6781 65.25 271 0
2 17.97 17.78 17.48 046 0.14
3 3449 34.43 33.76 0.86 0.16
4 22.5 2252 21.88 1.67 019
5 72.08 71.65 69.8 10.52 1 03
6 85.59 85.75 27.92 60.86 8 67
7 5694 5679 005 56.74 303
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Table A1.19: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb2, with -0.15 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7983 58308 1 3603 3573 3573 0 0
2 958 956 956 0 0
3 18.39 1822 1822 0 0
4 12 1196 1196 0 0
5 3844 3866 0 0
6 45.65 457 457 0 0
7 3037 3015 3015 0 0
09 8982 65571 1 4054 4032 4016 016 0
2 10.78 1072 1071 001 0
3 2069 2046 20.45 001 0
4 135 1365 1364 002 0
5 4324 4318 431 008 001
6 5135 51.74 51 65 01 001
7 3416 34 17 3406 011 001
1 9684 71270 1 4504 45.05 4419 091 0
2 11 98 11.9 11 77 015 004
3 2299 2298 2283 018 002
4 15 15 11 1497 026 003
5 4805 47.58 4663 1.14 011
6 5706 5745 5643 1.5 019
7 3796 3779 3366 412 048
11 98 51 74559 1 4954 49 19 4784 14 0
2 13 18 1298 1279 024 006
3 25.29 2548 25 28 027 005
4 16.5 1639 1605 057 006
5 5286 5274 5085 256 024
6 62 77 6294 6041 513 067
7 41 76 4159 21 21 2038 261
12 9869 77378 1 5405 53.74 52 05 1 76 0
2 1438 1396 13 81 023 007
3 2759 2758 2726 0.4 007
4 18 1794 1752 076 008
5 5766 5758 5524 352 035
6 6847 6837 6507 875 119
7 4555 4546 392 4155 546
13 99 13 79982 1 5855 58 63 5651 222 0
2 1557 15.54 1526 038 01
3 2989 2983 2934 059 009
4 195 196 1917 106 01
5 62 47 62.33 59.28 6.23 0 63
6 74 18 73.79 5621 2271 3 18
7 4935 4929 015 4914 513
14 9924 82193 1 63 06 6299 6063 254 0
2 1677 1704 1665 055 017
3 3219 32.54 31 86 086 016
4 21 2097 20 2 1.55 018
5 6727 66 56 63 71 856 078
6 7988 79.02 43.06 3992 571
7 5314 53 01 5291 396
15 9927 84309 1 6756 6781 65 12 284 0
2 1797 1778 17.45 051 015
3 3449 3443 33 72 092 017
4 225 22 52 2167 1.83 0.22
5 7208 71 65 6959 10.6 098
6 8559 85 75 2866 6023 854
7 5694 5679 006 5673 314
Table A1.20: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb2, with -0J0 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pal.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 79 83 58308 1 3603 35 73 35.73 0 0
2 958 956 9.56 0 0
3 1839 1822 1822 0 0
4 12 1196 11.96 0 0
5 3844 3866 3866 0 0
6 45.65 45 7 45.7 0 0
7 3037 3015 3015 0 0
09 8982 65571 1 4054 4032 40 16 0.16 0
2 1078 10.72 1071 0.01 0
3 2069 2046 2045 0.01 0
4 135 1365 13 64 002 0
5 4324 43 18 43.1 008 0.01
6 51 35 51 74 51.65 01 001
7 3416 34 17 3406 011 0.01
1 9684 71275 1 45 04 45 05 4419 091 0
2 11 98 11 9 11.77 0.16 005
3 2299 2298 2283 017 003
4 15 15 11 1496 027 002
5 4805 4758 46 66 113 0.11
6 5706 . 5745 56.42 1.5 0.21
7 37.96 3779 3365 413 048
11 98 51 74559 1 49 54 49 19 4784 14 0
2 13 18 1298 12 79 024 006
3 25 29 25 48 25.28 027 005
4 16.5 1639 1605 0.57 006
5 52 86 52 74 50 85 2.56 0.24
6 6277 6294 6041 5.13 067
7 41 76 41 59 21 21 2038 261
12 9869 77378 1 5405 53 74 5205 1 76 0
2 1438 1396 1381 023 007
3 2759 2758 2726 0.4 007
4 18 1794 17.52 076 008
5 57.66 5758 5524 352 0.35
6 6847 6837 65.07 875 119
7 45 55 4546 392 41.55 5.46
13 99 13 79982 1 5855 5863 56.51 2.22 0
2 1557 1554 1526 0.38 01
3 2989 29 83 2934 0.59 009
4 195 196 19.17 106 01
5 6247 6233 5928 6.23 063
6 7418 73 79 56.21 22.71 3 18
7 4935 49.29 015 4914 5.13
1 4 99 25 82201 1 63.06 62 99 60.5 2.6 0
2 1677 17.04 16.83 038 01
3 3219 32.54 31.85 089 017
4 21 20.97 20.24 157 02
5 67 27 66.56 63.61 8.62 0.83
6 7988 7902 431 39.86 567
7 53 14 53 0.1 5291 394
15 9927 84309 1 6756 6781 65.12 2.84 0
2 1797 17.78 1745 0.51 015
3 3449 3443 33 72 0.92 017
4 22.5 2252 21.67 183 022
5 7208 71.65 69.59 10.6 098
6 85.59 85.75 28.66 60 23 8.54
7 56.94 5679 006 5673 314
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Table A1.21: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb2, with +0.0 5 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7983 58308 1 3603 35 73 35 73 0 0
2 958 956 956 0 0
3 18.39 1822 1822 0 0
4 12 11.96 1196 0 0
5 38 44 3866 3866 0 0
6 4565 45.7 457 0 0
7 3037 3015 3015 0 0
09 8979 65569 1 40 54 4032 40 2 013 0
2 1078 1072 10 71 002 001
3 2069 2046 2045 002 0
4 135 1365 13.64 002 0
5 4324 43 18 431 008 001
6 5135 51 74 51 66 011 001
7 34 16 3417 3396 021 003
1 9649 71275 1 4504 4505 4448 06 0
2 1198 119 1186 007 003
3 2299 2298 2287 013 003
4 15 1511 15 02 002
5 4805 4758 46.81 093 009
6 5706 5745 56.65 154 016
7 3796 3779 31.96 583 075
11 9791 74554 1 49 54 49.19 4829 092 0
2 1318 1298 1288 012 003
3 2529 2548 2532 021 002
4 165 1639 1628 037 004
5 5286 5274 51.24 219 027
6 6277 6294 6078 524 069
7 41 76 4159 1822 2337 308
12 98 15 77390 1 5405 53 74 5265 116 0
2 1438 1396 1381 021 006
3 2759 2758 27.34 032 0.06
4 18 1794 1766 055 0.08
5 5766 5758 5592 303 -0.28
6 6847 6837 6418 98 137
7 4555 4546 203 4343 561
13 98 7 80052 1 58 55 5863 57.21 149 0
2 1557 1554 1539 022 006
3 29 89 2983 2948 044 006
4 19.5 19 6 1923 095 01
5 6247 6233 6027 5.88 058
6 7418 7379 53 17 25.27 382
7 4935 4929 015 4915 465
14 98 87 82333 1 6306 6299 613 178 0
2 1677 1704 1687 028 008
3 32 19 3254 32 05 066 011
4 21 2097 2046 134 017
5 6727 6656 6485 792 083
6 79 88 7902 3968 43.16 621
7 53 14 53 011 52.89 382
15 9888 84441 1 67.56 6781 65.87 205 0
2 1797 1778 1753 036 011
3 3449 3443 3386 073 011
4 225 22.52 22 16 143 016
5 7208 71.65 7075 1006 1.08
6 85.59 8575 25 1 63.49 916
7 5694 5679 005 5674 2.84
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Table A1.22: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb2, with +0.10 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 79.83 58308 1 3603 3573 3573 0 0
2 958 9.56 956 0 0
3 1839 1822 1822 0 0
4 12 1196 11.96 0 0
5 3844 3866 38.66 0 0
6 4565 457 457 0 0
7 3037 30 15 30.15 0 0
09 89.78 65569 1 4054 4032 4022 011 0
2 1078 1072 10.71 001 0
3 2069 2046 2045 001 0
4 135 1365 13.64 002 0
5 4324 43 18 43.07 0.11 001
6 5135 5174 5166 011 001
7 3416 3417 33.92 024 003
1 96 32 71247 1 4504 4505 4461 047 0
2 11 98 119 11.84 0.09 003
3 2299 2298 229 01 002
4 15 15 11 14.97 024 003
5 4805 4758 4689 09 009
6 5706 5745 5664 1.63 021
7 37.96 37 79 31 38 6.41 0 83
11 9762 74510 1 4954 4919 4844 0.77 0
2 13.18 1298 1291 0.1 002
3 25.29 2548 2536 016 003
4 165 16.39 1614 0.42 004
5 52.86 52.74 51.49 1.94 017
6 6277 6294 6109 518 069
7 4176 41 59 169 24.69 332
12 9799 77405 1 5405 5374 5284 094 0
2 1438 1396 13.85 015 004
3 2759 2758 27.38 026 004
4 18 17.94 17.72 051 007
5 5766 57.58 5605 3.03 03
6 6847 6837 63.7 1022 149
7 4555 4546 167 4379 556
1 3 9856 80056 1 5855 5863 5742 1.29 0
2 1557 1554 1537 0.24 008
3 2989 2983 2949 043 007
4 19.5 19.6 19.36 082 009
5 6247 6233 60.57 551 058
6 7418 7379 5223 26.33 375
7 4935 4929 0.13 49.17 476
14 9871 82328 1 63.06 6299 6141 1.65 0
2 1677 1704 1693 0.24 006
3 3219 3254 3212 0.57 013
4 21 2097 2049 126 015
5 67.27 66.56 6533 751 078
6 7988 7902 3853 44.3 628
7 53.14 53 011 5289 381
1 5 9873 84460 1 67.56 6781 6609 18 0
2 17.97 1778 1756 0.32 008
3 3449 3443 3398 063 009
4 225 2252 2208 149 0.18
5 72.08 71 65 71 09 9.83 1.05
6 85.59 85 75 24.09 64.46 927
7 5694 5679 007 5672 281
Table A1.23: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb2, with +0.15 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7983 58308 1 36.03 35 73 35 73 0 0
2 958 956 956 0 0
3 1839 1822 1822 0 0
4 12 1196 1196 0 0
5 3844 3866 3866 0 0
6 4565 45.7 45.7 0 0
7 3037 3015 3015 0 0
09 8976 65569 1 40 54 4032 40 23 009 0
2 1078 1072 1071 0.01 0
3 2069 2046 2045 0.01 0
4 13 5 1365 13.64 002 0
5 4324 43 18 431 009 001
6 51 35 51 74 51 66 012 001
7 3416 3417 3385 032 004
1 96 17 71220 1 4504 45 05 4468 041 0
2 1198 119 1184 006 003
3 2299 2298 2291 009 0
4 15 1511 15 019 002
5 4805 4758 46.95 084 008
6 5706 5745 5676 1.64 02
7 3796 3779 3075 704 095
1 1 973 74457 1 4954 49 19 48.57 063 0
2 13 18 1298 1296 007 002
3 2529 2548 25 4 0.13 005
4 165 16.39 16.3 031 005
5 5286 52.74 51.42 1.97 0 22
6 6277 6294 613 513 065
7 4176 4159 1561 2598 35
12 9776 77349 1 5405 53 74 5294 084 0
2 1438 1396 1388 012 O04
3 2759 2758 2737 027 -004
4 18 1794 1775 046 -06
5 5766 57.58 564 273 0.28
6 6847 68.37 63 13 1082 1 55
7 45 55 45 46 1.21 4426 558
13 9833 80029 1 5855 58.63 576 109 0
2 15 57 1554 1541 0.19 006
3 2989 2983 2956 036 006
4 19.5 196 19 4 078 009
5 6247 6233 6095 52 057
6 74 18 73 79 5099 27.52 382
7 4935 4929 0.12 4918 472
14 9852 82339 1 6306 6299 6165 14 0
2 1677 1704 1697 017 006
3 3219 3254 3218 05 01
4 21 2097 2069 108 014
5 67.27 6656 6542 759 0.8
6 79 88 7902 37.5 4524 645
7 5314 53 008 5292 372
15 98 6 84485 1 67 56 6781 66.19 169 0
2 1797 1778 17.64 0.27 007
3 3449 3443 34 058 013
4 225 2252 22.17 128 015
5 7208 71.65 7196 9 16 094
6 85 59 85.75 2264 65.85 947
7 5694 56.79 007 56.73 275
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Table A1.24: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb2, with +0.20 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax
Factor Factor (*/6) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7983 58308 1 3603 3573 3573 0 0
2 958 956 956 0 0
3 1839 1822 18.22 0 0
4 12 1196 1196 0 0
5 3844 3866 3866 0 0
6 4565 457 45.7 0 0
7 3037 3015 3015 0 0
09 89.74 65562 1 4054 4032 4025 008 0
2 1078 10.72 1071 001 0
3 2069 2046 20.45 001 0
4 135 1365 1365 002 001
5 4324 43.18 4307 01 002
6 5135 51.74 51.66 013 001
7 3416 3417 3377 039 006
1 9586 71143 1 4504 4505 44.76 0.31 0
2 11 98 11.9 11 87 004 0 02
3 2299 2298 229 01 001
4 15 1511 151 012 002
5 4805 4758 4701 0.78 01
6 5706 5745 5684 169 021
7 37.96 3779 2967 8 12 108
11 9689 74359 1 4954 4919 4873 048 0
2 1318 1298 1294 006 002
3 2529 2548 2538 012 002
4 165 1639 1633 027 002
5 5286 5274 5162 178 021
6 62.77 62 94 61 68 5.05 0 66
7 4176 4159 1391 2768 379
12 9748 77283 1 5405 5374 53.1 0.67 0
2 1438 1396 1393 0.07 002
3 27.59 2758 2739 0.23 004
4 18 17.94 17.79 0.42 004
5 5766 5758 56.46 272 028
6 6847 68.37 6252 1151 159
7 45.55 45.46 082 4464 566
1 3 98 1 79991 1 5855 5863 57.8 088 0
2 1557 1554 15.44 016 005
3 2989 2983 2956 035 006
4 19.5 19.6 19.42 073 009
5 62.47 62 33 61.5 5.03 0.54
6 7418 73.79 49.67 28.64 42
7 4935 4929 0.09 49.2 451
1 4 9823 82306 1 63.06 62.99 61.94 1 12 0
2 1677 17.04 1692 018 007
3 3219 3254 32.33 0.33 007
4 21 2097 20.71 1.02 012
5 67.27 66.56 65 96 7.42 0 77
6 79.88 7902 3585 46.79 682
7 5314 53 008 5293 362
1 5 9832 84474 1 67.56 67.81 66.52 134 0
2 17.97 1778 17.67 019 005
3 3449 34.43 34.15 0.44 007
4 22.5 22.52 2217 1.2 016
5 7208 71 65 72.27 911 086
6 85.59 8575 21 18 67.32 9 74
7 56.94 56 79 0.05 56.74 2.75
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Table A1.25: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb3, with -0.05 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill PaI.
Factor Factor (/9) Revenue (p (Actual) Sell-up
08 7983 58308 1 3603 3573 3573 0 0
2 9.58 956 956 0 0
3 18.39 1822 1822 0 0
4 12 1196 1196 0 0
5 3844 3866 38.66 0 0
6 4565 45.7 457 0 0
7 3037 3015 3015 0 0
09 8982 65573 1 4054 4032 4018 015 0
2 1078 1072 1071 001 0
3 2069 2046 2045 001 0
4 135 1365 13.65 002 0
5 4324 43 18 4309 01 001
6 51 35 51 74 51.66 0.1 0
7 3416 3417 3404 013 002
1 9676 71288 1 4504 45.05 443 078 0
2 1198 119 11.79 013 003
3 2299 2298 22.85 014 002
4 15 1511 1499 025 001
5 4805 4758 4662 115 013
6 5706 5745 5645 155 019
7 3796 3779 3328 451 055
1 1 98 33 74575 1 4954 4919 4798 1.25 0
2 13 18 1298 1286 016 005
3 2529 2548 2533 024 003
4 165 16.39 16 15 048 008
5 5286 5274 5089 255 024
6 6277 6294 6052 5.12 071
7 41 76 41 59 20.29 213 27
1 2 9852 77408 1 5405 5374 5232 149 0
2 1438 1396 1382 02 006
3 2759 2758 2729 036 006
4 18 17.94 1759 067 007
5 5766 5758 55.31 352 033
6 6847 6837 6496 898 125
7 45.55 4546 318 4228 557
1 3 9897 80024 1 5855 5863 5684 187 0
2 1557 1554 15.31 0.35 008
3 2989 29.83 2939 056 01
4 195 196 1922 095 013
5 6247 6233 5948 62 057
6 74.18 7379 55 14 23.71 335
7 4935 49.29 017 49.12 505
14 9911 82281 1 6306 6299 6085 224 0
2 1677 1704 1686 03 009
3 32 19 32.54 31.89 077 013
4 21 2097 2039 134 012
5 6727 66.56 6439 8.15 076
6 79.88 7902 41 37 41.66 598
7 5314 53 012 5289 401
1 5 9908 84407 1 6756 6781 6543 2.5 0
2 1797 1778 1752 0.42 012
3 3449 3443 33 85 0.79 016
4 225 22.52 21 77 1.64 021
5 7208 71.65 71 18 952 09
1 6 8559 8575 2598 62.81 904
7 5694 5679 008 5672 304
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Table A1.26: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb3. with -0.10 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pai
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7983 58308 1 3603 3573 35.73 0 0
2 958 956 9.56 0 0
3 18.39 1822 1822 0 0
4 12 1196 11.96 0 0
5 3844 3866 3866 0 0
6 4565 457 457 0 0
7 3037 3015 3015 0 0
09 8982 65573 1 4054 4032 4018 015 0
2 1078 1072 10.71 001 0
3 2069 2046 2045 001 0
4 135 1365 1365 002 0
5 4324 43 18 4309 01 001
6 51.35 51 74 5166 01 0
7 3416 3417 3404 013 002
1 96.76 71288 1 4504 4505 443 078 0
2 11.98 119 1179 0.13 003
3 2299 22.98 22 85 014 002
4 15 1511 1499 025 001
5 4805 4758 4662 1 15 013
6 5706 5745 56.45 155 019
7 3796 3779 3328 451 055
1 1 9833 74563 1 4954 4919 47.97 126 0
2 13 18 1298 1286 016 004
3 2529 2548 2533 024 003
4 16.5 1639 1612 048 008
5 5286 5274 5086 254 021
6 62.77 6294 6046 523 067
7 41.76 41 59 2041 21 18 276
1 2 9851 77386 1 5405 5374 52.29 152 0
2 1438 1396 1382 022 007
3 2759 2758 27.27 038 008
4 18 1794 17.59 067 007
5 5766 5758 5534 353 033
6 68.47 68.37 6475 907 129
7 45.55 4546 3.41 42.05 545
13 9899 80017 1 58.55 58.63 5682 194 0
2 1557 1554 1528 0.35 012
3 2989 29.83 2938 055 008
4 195 196 1922 094 01
5 62.47 62.33 5942 62 056
6 7418 7379 5534 2355 329
7 49.35 49.29 015 4914 5.1
14 99.12 82245 1 63.06 6299 6087 2.23 0
2 1677 1704 16.82 034 01
3 3219 3254 31 85 079 0.12
4 21 2097 20.38 14 01
5 6727 6656 63.71 865 08
6 7988 79.02 4215 4093 58
7 53.14 53 0.14 5287 405
15 9914 84390 1 67.56 67.81 6546 248 0
2 1797 17.78 1749 0.44 013
3 34.49 3443 33.81 083 014
4 225 22.52 21 8 17 021
5 72.08 71.65 70.04 1035 098
6 85.59 85.75 27.29 61 53 8 74
7 5694 56.79 007 5673 308
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Table A1.27: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb3, with -0.15 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill PaI.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7983 58308 1 3603 3573 3573 0 0
2 958 956 956 0 0
3 1839 1822 1822 0 0
4 12 11 96 1196 0 0
5 38.44 3866 3866 0 0
6 4565 45.7 45.7 0 0
7 3037 30.15 3015 0 0
09 8982 65571 1 4054 4032 4017 016 0
2 1078 1072 107 002 001
3 2069 20.46 2045 001 0
4 13.5 13.65 1364 002 0
5 4324 43 18 431 0.08 001
6 51 35 51 74 5165 0.1 001
7 3416 3417 3406 011 001
1 9684 71274 1 4504 45.05 44.21 088 0
2 11 98 119 11 77 016 004
3 2299 2298 2283 017 002
4 15 15 11 1494 027 002
5 4805 4758 4661 1 15 009
6 5706 5745 5648 15 018
7 3796 3779 3364 415 053
1 1 98.52 74565 1 4954 4919 4782 142 0
2 13 18 1298 1283 0.21 005
3 25.29 2548 2528 027 005
4 165 1639 1605 058 006
5 5286 5274 5084 256 024
6 6277 6294 60.45 508 067
7 4176 4159 212 204 259
1 2 9869 77385 1 5405 5374 5212 171 0
2 1438 1396 1381 024 0-08
3 2759 2758 2719 047 009
4 18 1794 1753 076 0-08
5 5766 5758 5523 354 -_0-36
6 6847 6837 65 1 872 118
7 4555 4546 3.91 4156 545
13 99 12 79980 1 5855 5863 56.64 2.09 0
2 15.57 1554 1521 043 01
3 29.89 2983 2921 07 01
4 195 196 1914 107 008
5 6247 6233 5934 619 06
6 7418 7379 562 2274 32
7 49.35 4929 015 4915 514
14 9924 82202 1 6306 6299 6066 248 0
2 1677 1704 1676 046 015
3 3219 3254 317 1 018
4 21 2097 2023 157 016
5 6727 66.56 6368 8.61 083
6 7988 7902 43.05 3989 573
7 53 14 53 0.1 529 392
1 5 9925 84298 1 6756 67.81 6522 2.74 0
2 1797 1778 1742 053 015
3 3449 3443 3361 103 016
4 22.5 2252 2161 186 021
5 7208 7165 6961 10.58 096
6 8559 8575 2868 60.19 854
7 5694 5679 005 56.74 3 12
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Table A1.28: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb3, with -0.20 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill PaxL
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 79.83 58308 1 3603 3573 3573 0 0
2 958 956 956 0 0
3 1839 1822 18.22 0 0
4 12 1196 1196 0 0
5 3844 3866 3866 0 0
6 4565 457 457 0 0
7 3037 3015 3015 0 0
09 8982 65571 1 4054 4032 4017 0.16 0
2 1078 1072 107 002 001
3 2069 2046 2045 001 0
4 135 1365 1364 002 0
5 4324 43 18 431 008 0.01
6 5135 5174 51.65 01 001
7 3416 3417 3406 0.11 001
1 9684 71277 1 4504 4505 4422 088 0
2 11 98 11.9 11 76 016 0.04
3 2299 2298 2284 016 002
4 15 1511 1494 027 002
5 4805 47.58 4661 1 15 01
6 57.06 5745 5648 15 0.17
7 3796 3779 3363 4.15 053
1 1 98.52 74569 1 4954 4919 4782 142 0
2 13 18 1298 12.83 0.2 005
3 2529 2548 2529 025 005
4 165 1639 16.04 058 006
5 52.86 52.74 5086 255 0.23
6 6277 6294 6043 51 068
7 4176 41 59 212 204 2.59
1.2 9869 77377 1 54.05 5374 5207 175 0
2 14.38 1396 1378 026 008
3 2759 2758 2727 04 008
4 18 1794 1752 076 009
5 5766 5758 5525 352 034
6 6847 6837 6506 875 119
7 4555 4546 393 4154 544
13 99 13 79983 1 5855 5863 5658 216 0
2 15.57 1554 15.2 0.42 011
3 2989 2983 29.32 059 008
4 195 196 1915 107 009
5 6247 6233 59.33 624 062
6 7418 7379 5618 2271 324
7 4935 4929 0.15 4914 5 1
14 9925 82197 1 63.06 6299 6058 2.58 0
2 1677 1704 167 049 016
3 3219 3254 3187 086 015
4 21 2097 20.21 156 019
5 67.27 6656 6367 855 08
6 7988 7902 43.1 3992 566
7 5314 53 01 529 399
1 5 99.26 84299 1 67.56 6781 6519 279 0
2 1797 1778 1735 057 016
3 34.49 3443 3371 091 014
4 22.5 2252 2167 182 02
5 7208 7165 6952 1061 097
6 85.59 85.75 28.75 6024 847
7 5694 5679 0.06 5674 324
150
Table A1.29: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb3, with +0.05 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill PaL
Factor Factor 0/9) Revenue (input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7983 58308 1 3603 3573 3573 0 0
2 958 956 956 0 0
3 18.39 1822 1822 0 0
4 12 11.96 1196 0 0
5 3844 3866 3866 0 0
6 45.65 45.7 45.7 0 0
7 30.37 30.15 3015 0 0
09 8982 65573 1 4054 4032 4018 0.15 0
2 1078 1072 1071 0.01 0
3 2069 2046 2045 001 0
4 135 1365 1365 002 0
5 4324 4318 4309 01 001
6 5135 5174 5166 0.1 0
7 3416 3417 3404 013 002
19675 71282 1 4504 4505 4431 078 0
2 11 98 119 1179 0.13 003
3 2299 2298 2284 015 002
4 15 15 11 1496 024 001
5 4805 4758 4663 116 009
6 57.06 5745 565 1.52 02
7 37.96 37.79 3323 4.56 057
11 9829 74586 1 4954 4919 4802 122 0
1318 1298 12.86 014 005
3 2529 2548 2531 022 002
4 165 1639 1611 048 005
5 5286 5274 5094 246 02
6 6277 6294 60.97 483 067
7 41 76 4159 1972 21 87 286
12 9848 77415 1 5405 5374 5234 148 0
2 1438 1396 1381 021 007
3 2759 2758 27.28 0.37 006
4 18 1794 1761 063 007
______5 5766 5758 5546 336 -03
6 6847 6837 6512 889 123
7 4555 4546 276 42.7 564
13 9895 80047 1 5855 5863 5689 183 0
2 15 57 1554 1528 0.33 009
3 2989 2983 294 052 007
4 195 196 1929 087 009
5 6247 6233 6002 575 056
6 7418 7379 5444 24.42 344
7 4935 4929 019 49.11 507
14 9903 82346 1 6306 6299 60.99 21 0
2 1677 1704 1686 029 009
3 32 19 3254 3197 069 012
4 21 2097 2045 1.17 013
5 6727 6656 656 7.21 064
6 7988 79.02 3967 4345 625
7 53 14 53 015 52.85 409
15 9901 84545 1 6756 6781 6565 2.26 0
______ 2 1797 1778 17.56 034 01
______ 
3 3449 3443 33.92 065 012
______________ 
______ 
4 225 2252 2198 126 014
_______________________ 
5 7208 71.65 7305 7.95 072
_______ _ ____6 8559 8575 23.4 6557 935
_______________ 
______ 
7 5694 5679 0.09 56.7 322
151
Table A1.30: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb3, with +0.10 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Paz.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7983 58308 1 3603 3573 3573 0 0
2 958 956 956 0 0
3 18.39 1822 1822 0 0
4 12 1196 1196 0 0
5 3844 3866 3866 0 0
6 45 65 45.7 45.7 0 0
7 30.37 3015 3015 0 0
09 8982 65573 1 4054 4032 40.18 015 0
2 10.78 1072 1071 001 0
3 2069 2046 2045 001 0
4 135 13.65 1365 002 0
5 4324 43 18 43.09 01 001
6 5135 51.74 5166 0.1 0
7 34 16 3417 3404 013 002
1 9675 71290 1 4504 4505 443 079 0
2 1198 119 1182 011 004
3 2299 2298 2285 015 002
4 15 15 11 1497 024 001
5 48.05 4758 4664 114 01
6 5706 5745 5651 1.5 02
7 3796 3779 3317 462 056
11 9825 74585 1 49 54 49 19 4799 124 0
2 1318 1298 1287 015 004
3 2529 2548 2535 019 003
4 165 1639 16.13 047 006
5 5286 5274 51 236 021
6 62.77 62.94 61 28 462 0.62
7 4176 41.59 1922 2237 2.96
1 2 98.46 77422 1 54.05 53.74 52.35 1.45 0
2 14.38 13.96 13.82 0.19 006
3 27.59 2758 27.3 0.36 005
4 18 17.94 17.65 064 0.07
5 5766 5758 5548 33 036
6 68.47 6837 65 11 8.91 1.2
7 4555 4546 264 4282 565
13 9895 80080 1 58.55 58 63 5692 1.81 0
2 15.57 15.54 15.3 03 0.09
3 2989 2983 2941 0.51 006
4 19.5 196 19.36 081 009
5 6247 62.33 6034 557 057
6 74.18 7379 5398 2475 358
7 4935 49.29 018 4911 494
14 9901 82380 1 63.06 6299 6101 2.06 0
2 16.77 17.04 1689 026 0.07
3 3219 32.54 3203 063 012
4 21 2097 20.42 1.13 012
5 67.27 6656 66.3 68 058
6 79.88 79.02 38 82 4409 654
7 53 14 53 0.16 5284 389
15 9895 84566 1 6756 6781 65.7 2.23 0
2 17.97 1778 17.56 033 012
3 3449 34.43 33.94 062 01
4 22.5 22.52 2204 1.19 0.13
5 7208 7165 7388 744 071
6 85.59 85 75 2228 66.52 967
7 5694 5679 01l 5669 3.05
Table A1.31: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb3, with +0.15 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7983 58308 1 3603 3573 3573 0 0
2 958 956 956 0 0
3 1839 1822 1822 0 0
4 12 1196 1196 0 0
5 38.44 3866 3866 0 0
6 4565 45 7 457 0 0
7 3037 3015 3015 0 0
09 89 82 65573 1 4054 4032 4018 015 0
2 1078 1072 1071 001 0
3 20.69 2046 2045 0.01 0
4 135 1365 1365 002 0
5 4324 43.18 4309 01 001
6 5135 51.74 51 66 01 0
7 34 16 34 17 34.04 013 002
1 96 74 71285 1 4504 4505 4429 081 0
2 11.98 11 9 11.8 012 005
3 2299 2298 2285 015 002
4 15 15 11 1499 023 003
5 48 05 4758 4663 1 13 01
6 5706 5745 5655 147 018
7 3796 3779 33 13 466 057
1 1 9822 74583 1 4954 49 19 48.02 1 19 0
2 13 18 1298 1285 016 003
3 2529 2548 2532 02 002
4 165 1639 1614 045 004
5 5286 5274 51.03 233 0.19
6 62.77 6294 6148 45 062
7 41 76 41 59 18.91 2268 304
12 98 45 77432 1 5405 53 74 52.36 143 0
2 1438 1396 1383 019 005
3 2759 2758 273 034 006
4 18 1794 17.68 062 006
5 5766 5758 5547 328 036
6 6847 6837 652 885 117
7 4555 45 46 246 43 569
13 98 91 80082 1 5855 5863 56.97 179 0
2 1557 15 54 1529 032 0.13
3 29 89 29 83 2941 048 007
4 19.5 19.6 1937 078 0.07
5 6247 6233 60 51 533 055
6 74 18 73 79 53.66 2527 35
7 4935 49.29 019 49.1 5 13
14 9897 82397 1 6306 6299 6105 201 0
2 1677 1704 16 9 0 26 007
3 3219 3254 3205 06 012
4 21 2097 2048 106 011
5 6727 6656 6668 639 057
6 79 88 79 02 38.24 4477 651
7 5314 53 015 5285 399
15 98 89 84587 1 6756 6781 65.75 215 0
2 17.97 1778 17.56 031 009
3 3449 3443 3395 058 009
4 225 22 52 22 17 1.06 0l
5 7208 7165 7448 705 072
6 8559 8575 2133 6742 988
7 5694 5679 0.13 56.67 3
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Table A1.32: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb3, with +0.20 sell-up error
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pa.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7983 58308 1 3603 3573 35.73 0 0
2 958 956 956 0 0
3 1839 1822 1822 0 0
4 12 11.96 1196 0 0
5 3844 38.66 38.66 0 0
6 4565 457 45.7 0 0
7 3037 3015 30.15 0 0
09 8982 65573 1 4054 4032 4018 015 0
2 1078 1072 1071 001 0
3 2069 2046 2045 001 0
4 135 1365 1365 002 0
5 4324 43 18 4309 01 001
6 5135 5174 5166 01 0
7 3416 3417 3404 0.13 002
1 9674 71284 1 4504 4505 4429 08 0
2 1198 119 118 012 004
3 2299 2298 2286 0.14 002
4 15 15 11 1499 022 002
5 4805 4758 4664 1 12 0l
6 5706 5745 56.57 147 0.18
7 3796 3779 3309 469 0.59
1 1 982 74611 1 4954 4919 4807 1 17 0
2 13.18 1298 1286 015 006
3 2529 2548 25.36 019 002
4 165 1639 1615 044 006
5 5286 5274 51.05 2.25 02
6 6277 6294 6167 436 056
7 41 76 41 59 1856 2304 309
12 9843 77427 1 5405 5374 5237 143 0
2 1438 1396 1384 018 006
3 2759 2758 27.31 034 006
4 18 1794 1764 0.6 007
5 5766 5758 5556 32 031
6 6847 6837 6513 897 118
7 4555 4546 24 4306 573
13 98 89 80096 1 5855 5863 5697 174 0
2 15 57 15.54 15.33 0.28 008
3 2989 29.83 2943 046 007
4 195 196 194 074 006
5 6247 6233 6078 5 13 054
6 74.18 73.79 5327 25.54 358
7 4935 4929 0.18 4911 502
14 9894 82406 1 6306 62.99 6106 201 0
2 16.77 1704 16.9 025 0.07
3 32 19 3254 3208 059 0.11
4 21 2097 2052 104 013
5 6727 6656 6712 603 059
6 7988 7902 3762 4548 6.59
7 53 14 53 0.18 5283 408
1 5 98 85 84619 1 6756 6781 6578 211 0
2 1797 1778 1763 026 009
3 3449 3443 3398 056 0l
4 22.5 2252 2223 095 01
5 7208 71.65 75.12 653 066
6 85.59 85.75 20 37 68 42 999
7 56.94 5679 014 5665 1 304
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A2: Sensitivity of Z-factor
Table A2.1: Scenario 1, Case 1, under riginal EISRb, with Z-factor of 2.06
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pal.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7848 39447 1 3603 3586 35 52 0 4 0
2 3844 38.57 3869 0.28 006
3 4565 45.54 4351 203 04
09 85 26 43607 1 4054 4038 39.78 086 0
2 4324 43 11 4348 103 026
3 51 35 51 7 4464 706 14
1 8996 47422 1 45.04 45 14 43 91 175 0
2 4805 48.29 4949 174 051
3 5706 5697 4154 1543 293
11 9207 50525 1 49 54 49.51 47.84 2 56 0
2 5286 5291 5522 315 089
3 6277 63 15 3505 28.1 546
1 2 9369 54038 1 5405 54.77 5282 3.23 0
2 5766 57.66 61.26 455 128
3 6847 6852 2645 4206 814
13 9386 56553 1 58 55 5855 56 41 4.08 0
2 6247 6265 6699 665 195
3 74 18 737 1739 5631 1099
14 942 59522 1 6306 62 54 6045 4.31 0
2 67.27 6742 74 16 758 221
3 7988 8035 669 7366 1432
1 5 9534 62047 1 6756 6789 6489 651 0
2 7208 723 7597 1214 351
3 8559 8525 215 8311 1581
155
Table A2.2: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb2, with Z-factor of 2.06
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7646 39276 1 3603 3586 3588 0.09 0
2 3844 3857 3951 03 01l
3 45.65 4554 39.3 624 124
09 8084 43222 1 4054 4038 4052 013 0
2 4324 43 11 4534 091 027
3 5135 51 7 35.4 163 314
1 8339 47040 1 4504 4514 4529 035 0
2 4805 4829 5263 15 05
3 5706 5697 2716 2981 584
1 1 843 50359 1 4954 4951 4986 036 0
2 5286 52.91 5968 2.34 071
3 6277 63.15 1691 4624 911
12 8529 54031 1 5405 5477 5529 052 0
2 5766 5766 6639 357 104
3 6847 6852 625 6226 123
13 873 56868 1 58 55 5855 5964 1.09 0
2 6247 6265 6924 731 218
3 7418 737 207 71.62 1391
14 8998 59842 1 6306 6254 6481 158 0
2 67.27 6742 6953 1298 385
3 7988 8035 064 7971 1509
1 5 92 15 62741 1 6756 6789 71 297 0
2 7208 723 6703 2055 609
3 8559 8525 02 85.05 1528
Table A2.3: Scenario 1, Case 1, under EMSRb3, with Z-factor of 2.06
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 784 39455 1 3603 35.86 3558 038 0
2 3844 38 57 38.71 027 01
3 4565 4554 43.32 222 041
09 8497 43633 1 4054 4038 3993 074 0
2 4324 43 11 4363 101 028
3 51.35 51 7 43.9 7.8 1 53
1 8928 47469 1 45.04 4514 44.17 1.41 0
2 4805 4829 50.03 152 044
3 5706 5697 3971 17.26 326
11 9089 50652 1 49.54 4951 48.3 1.98 0
2 5286 5291 5645 2.63 076
3 6277 63.15 31 6 31 56 617
12 92 15 54348 1 5405 54 77 5359 2.22 0
2 5766 5766 6333 3.57 103
3 6847 6852 21.31 472 924
13 91 92 56915 1 58.55 5855 57.12 278 0
2 6247 6265 7018 4.79 136
3 7418 73 7 1057 63 13 1233
14 93 19 59756 1 6306 6254 6141 342 0
2 6727 6742 7436 777 228
3 7988 8035 401 7633 1471
15 94 8 62439 1 6756 67 89 6665 544 0
2 7208 723 7411 1376 42
3 8559 8525 145 8381 1557
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Table A2.4: Scenario 2, Case 1, under original EMSRb, with Z-factor of 2.06
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 791 57775 1 3603 3573 3524 049 0
2 9.58 956 949 007 0
3 1839 1822 1821 0.01 0
4 12 1196 11.93 0.07 001
5 3844 3866 3835 0.35 004
6 4565 457 4531 044 004
7 3037 30 15 2972 044 005
09 871 63671 1 4054 4032 385 1.82 0
2 1078 1072 1053 02 0
3 2069 2046 2038 012 002
4 135 1365 1338 038 004
5 4324 43 18 4216 1.15 01
6 5135 5174 5079 124 013
7 3416 3417 31 57 26 029
1 9254 68418 1 4504 4505 4203 303 0
2 1198 119 1151 043 0
3 2299 2298 2271 036 004
4 15 15 11 147 065 009
5 4805 4758 45 13 286 024
6 5706 57.45 5466 374 041
7 3796 37.79 295 829 096
1 1 9498 71575 1 4954 4919 4472 447 0
1318 1298 1247 06 0
3 25.29 2548 2499 062 008
4 165 1639 158 106 013
5 5286 5274 4853 5.14 047
6 6277 6294 5767 744 093
7 4176 4159 2188 1972 217
12 9643 74569 1 5405 5374 4828 546 0
2 14.38 1396 1331 075 0
3 2759 2758 2697 076 .0.1
4 18 1794 1719 129 -015
5 5766 5758 5255 6.48 054
6 6847 6837 6052 1199 144
7 4555 4546 1067 3479 415
13 9734 77501 1 5855 5863 5224 639 0
2 1557 1554 1493 073 0
3 2989 2983 2922 085 012
4 195 196 1869 1 77 024
5 6247 6233 55 81 913 086
6 7418 7379 5878 2011 26
7 4935 49.29 201 4728 509
14 9796 79682 1 6306 6299 5532 768 0
2 1677 1704 1631 087 0
3 32 19 3254 3176 109 014
4 21 2097 1974 241 031
5 6727 6656 5852 1241 1 18
6 7988 7902 51 15 3268 437
7 53 14 53 0.35 5265 481
15 9843 81786 1 67.56 67.81 5929 852 0
2 1797 1778 16.95 103 0
3 3449 3443 33.42 137 0.2
4 225 22.52 212 2.7 036
5 7208 7165 6349 1472 138
6 8559 8575 39.78 5005 656
7 5694 5679 014 5666 408
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Table A2.5: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb2, with Z-factor of 2.06 ____
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pax.
Factor Factor (0/) Revenue (Input) (Actual) _______Sell-up
08 7903 57798 1 3603 3573 354 0.33 0
2 958 956 9.52 004 0
3 1839 1822 1821 002 001
4 12 1196 1193 007 0
5 3844 3866 3831 04 004
6 4565 457 45.28 05 005
7 3037 3015 2945 07 0.08
09 8665 63648 1 4054 4032 3895 1.37 0
2 1078 1072 1063 011 0
3 2069 2046 2038 0.12 002
4 135 1365 1343 032 005
5 4324 4318 4218 1 19 0.1
6 5135 51 74 5064 1.6 019
7 3416 3417 30 417 05
191 68 68526 1 4504 4505 4324 1 81 0
2 11 98 11.9 11.71 022 0
3 2299 22 98 228 024 003
4 15 15 11 1485 051 0.06
5 4805 4758 4521 288 025
6 5706 5745 5444 442 051
7 3796 3779 2595 11 84 142
1 1 9369 71682 1 4954 4919 4629 2.9 0
2 13 18 1298 1266 038 0
3 2529 25.48 25 14 043 005
4 165 1639 1595 088 009
5 5286 5274 4925 46 044
6 6277 6294 5766 835 1 11
7 41 76 41 59 16.02 .25.57 306
1.2 9489 74727 1 5405 5374 50.21 3.53 0
2 1438 1396 1365 0.4 0
3 2759 2758 27.11 061 0.09
4 18 17.94 17.41 106 013
5 5766 5758 5353 583 053
6 6847 6837 599 1338 178
7 4555 45.46 403 4143 492
13 962 77749 1 58.55 58.63 5451 413 0
2 1557 1554 1522 0.41 0
3 2989 29.83 2943 059 0.09
4 195 196 1901 156 02
5 6247 62 33 56 67 9.07 0.96
6 74.18 73.79 53.31 2527 341
7 4935 4929 0.79 48.5 479
14 9676 79983 1 63.06 62.99 578 519 0
2 1677 1704 16.73 045 0
3 32.19 3254 31 96 084 014
4 21 2097 2004 206 027
5 67.27 6656 6022 1179 1 13
6 79.88 7902 4337 3992 545
7 5314 53 017 5283 427
15 9724 82246 1 6756 6781 6224 558 0
2 17.97 17.78 1742 0.52 0
3 3449 3443 33.66 1.06 0.16
4 225 2252 21.7 2.27 0.29
5 7208 71.65 65 13 14.35 146
6 8559 85.75 31.2 5792 7.82
7 56.94 56.79 009 1 56.7 337
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Table A2.6: Scenario 2, Case 1, under EMSRb3, with Z-factor of 2.06
Demand Load Mean Class Demand Requests Load Spill Pal.
Factor Factor (%) Revenue (Input) (Actual) Sell-up
08 7909 57778 1 36.03 35.73 3527 046 0
2 958 956 948 008 001
3 1839 18.22 1821 002 0
4 12 11.96 1194 007 0
5 3844 3866 3834 036 004
6 4565 457 453 0.45 0 04
7 3037 30.15 2971 045 005
09 8708 63683 1 4054 4032 3861 174 0
2 1078 1072 105 023 003
3 2069 2046 2039 012 001
4 135 1365 1338 036 005
5 4324 43 18 4213 1 18 009
6 5135 51.74 5078 127 013
7 3416 3417 3146 27 032
1 9247 68448 1 4504 4505 4222 287 0
2 1198 119 1149 044 003
3 2299 2298 22.73 032 003
4 15 15 11 14.72 064 007
5 4805 4758 4516 286 024
6 5706 57.45 5456 384 044
7 3796 37.79 2922 857 096
1 1 9487 71613 1 4954 4919 4498 424 0
2 13 18 1298 1244 061 003
3 2529 2548 2505 055 007
4 165 1639 158 1 01 011
5 5286 5274 4855 5.12 042
6 6277 62.94 5758 771 094
7 41.76 41 59 214 202 235
12 96.3 74668 1 5405 5374 4865 5.16 0
2 1438 13.96 1328 077 007
3 2759 2758 2702 073 01
4 18 1794 1731 124 016
5 5766 57.58 52.78 638 061
6 6847 6837 60.57 11 87 1 57
7 4555 45.46 959 35 87 407
1.3 9721 77521 1 58 55 5863 52.52 612 0
2 1557 15.54 1494 07 001
3 2989 2983 29.21 082 01
4 195 19.6 1878 165 02
5 6247 6233 5575 933 083
6 7418 73.79 5823 2063 275
7 49.35 49.29 1 93 47.36 5 07
14 9783 79753 1 6306 6299 5571 731 0
2 16.77 1704 1636 084 003
3 3219 3254 3178 103 016
4 21 2097 1978 233 027
5 6727 6656 5869 1244 1 13
6 7988 79.02 50 18 3351 457
7 5314 53 034 5266 467
15 98.31 81915 1 6756 67 81 59.8 8.04 0
2 17.97 17.78 17 0.93 003
3 3449 3443 3346 129 015
4 225 22.52 21 29 261 032
5 7208 71.65 6417 1438 1 39
6 8559 8575 3811 5149 689
7 56.94 5679 016 5664 385
159
